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SYNOPSIS 
The Australian economy in the post second world war period 
heralded a golden age of expansion with the returned servicemen 
assured of jobs. The employment was based upon a historically 
sound agriculture culture with markets for wool and grain 
available in a hungry world and the potentially Insatiable demand 
of the Japanese Industry for coal and Iron ore. Labour shortages 
which threatened the rate of expansion were eased by a favourable 
immigration policy. This policy sought to provide skilled labour 
for Industry and a potential local demand for domestic products. 
Government investment in capital programmes such as the Snowy 
Mountain scheme could take a high proportion of service skilled 
labour and at the same time open up areas for the development of 
satellite industrial areas to decentralise Industry. 
The success of the policies cannot be denied but fundamentally the 
system relied too heavily upon raw materials to the exclusion of a 
need to develop a sound manufacturing basis capable of exploiting 
indigenous reserves. Technology was only advanced on a "needs 
must" basis with little thought to the future where the high 
living standard enjoyed could only be maintained by a higher gross 
domestic product capacity than that existing. 
The thesis is concerned with the growth of an originally all 
Australian owned coal mining organisation which sought to 
diversify its Interest by entering the fabrication and mining 
machinery industry both in Australia and in the open market 
overseas. 
Success of the parent company attracted overseas Investors in the 
first phase of takeover bids in Australia in the early 1960's and 
the company eventually became a wholly owned subsidiary of an 
International raining group. 
The role of industrial dispute as the basis for the decline of the 
metal manufacturing company has been examined. 
The thesis also examines the managerial skills in reviving Kidston 
gold mine. The mine was considered previously to be an 
unattractive proposition and uneconomic. The project was 
re-examined, revealing that the rejection was based upon 
managerial inflexibility and traditionally over-conservative 
methods of mine evaluation, construction, operation projected 
commodity prices and contingency factors. A fresh alternative 
to the traditional approach was examined and today the project is 
a recognised success within the Australian Mining Industry. 
The Kidston project has demonstrated the need to maximise upon 
capital investment, by reviewing profit margin as the basis for 
financing Australia's or indeed any resource rich nation in 
developing a sound economy. 
CHAPTER 1 1. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION - Understanding Marketing Management 
1.1 Introduction 
Marketing as a skill was developed in Australia after the end 
of World War II and received a boost of necessity after the 
entry of the United Kingdom into the European Common 
Market. The emergence of Japan as a major manufacturing and 
export base country came at the same period when the 
Australian coal mining and iron ore industries were 
favourably placed geographically to exploit the market 
potential of the fast developing Japanese Steel Industry. 
The period between 1955 and 1961 saw the emergence of 
Australian entrepreneurial management and marketing 
specialists who realised that the readily accessible reserves 
of coal and iron ore in Queensland, N.S.W. and Western 
Australia offered a stable source of raw materials to Japan 
co-incident with a major expansion of the BHP steel 
manufacturing industry. This period witnessed a major 
growth in capital investment in Australia with a demand for 
labour which could only be supplied by large scale 
immigration. 
The Calwell Government in 1949 introduced the subsidised ten 
pound fare scheme available to British immigrants on an open 
door basis (subject to specific qualifying conditions) and to 
European migrants of whom the majority came from Italy, 
Germany, Greece and Yugoslavia. These migrants were very 
quickly placed in industry in N.S.W., Victoria and to a 
lesser extent, in Queensland and other states. 1954 saw a 
massive increase of migrant intake from European migrants 
over the first four years of some 22% (N.S.W. Bureau of 
Statistics, 1955) 
3 0009 02870 4216 
The period between 1954 and 1961 created a new class of 
society in Australia based aroimd the capital cities of 
N.S.W. and Victoria whose lifestyle depended on 
manufacturing, steel, and mining which now rivalled the 
traditional agricultural industry as a market leader. 
The Japanese car industry, ship building industry and to a 
lesser extent, the electrical Industry, re-organised during 
this time and a pattern of dynamic marketing, by the car 
industry in particular, marked a penetration of world markets 
in 1960 with small fuel efficient cars designed to meet the 
rising fuel costs in the aftermath of the Suez crisis. 
Marketing in Australia was on an ad hoc basis with an 
expanding export market for minerals and for agricultural 
products which appeared to be insatiable. The home market 
boosted by wage increases, easily won by unions, was equally 
demanding for household goods, housing and consumer items. 
This was due to the influx of migrants with families and by 
the new generation of Australians now emerging from the 
return of the armed forces at the end of World War II. 
This era marked the commencement of the "fat cat" philosophy 
adopted by management and employees when Australia would now 
prosper on a presumably never ending favourable mineral 
export market. The Japanese heavy industry based on modern 
high productivity blast furnaces created an insatiable demand 
for metallurgical coke and Australia was a potential source 
for such a supply. Table 1.1 shows the details of the 
Australian coal export to overseas markets between 1950 and 
1959. Note the dramatic increase in export of coal to 
Japan. (J.C.B. 1960). 
Table 1.1 
Export of Black Coal from Australia (1950-1959) 
NSW (tonnes 000) 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
New Caledonia 51 77 129 138 163 168 157 182 143 145 
Fiji 9 18 20 23 22 18 17 11 12 12 
N.Z. & Pacific Islds 1 3 4 4 4 9 14 14 1 -
Japan - - - 55 - 9 27 451 362 493 
Korea - - - 125 169 7 61 85 162 22 
Hong Kong - - - - - 2 2 6 5 7 
Malaysia - - - 8 - - - 7 - -
Argentina — - - - - Ill 84 
Total N.S.W. 61 98 153 353 358 213 278 756 796 763 
QLD. (tonnes 000) 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Japan _ _ 5 _ _ 9 
Hong Kong - - 15 - - - - - - -
Korea - - - 8 - - - - - 10 
Argentina - - - - - - - - 3 -
Pakistan - - 29 - - - - - - -
S. Vietnam — - - - - 10 -
i i 
1 Total Queensland - - 49 8 - - - - 13 19 
; Total Australia 61 98 202 361 358 213 278 768 809 782 
The manufacturing of the raw material products was based upon 
buyer's need and Japan became a lucrative market for coal 
producers where the acquisition of coal contracts was easily 
obtained if the supplier in Australia could satisfy the 
customer of continuity of supply to the docks. Coal prices 
were negotiated at a most acceptable level to the producers 
with escalation clauses included for Consumer Price Index 
awards to industry and in addition the contracts provided 
incentives for the colliery companies to invest in capital 
equipment to increase output in existing mines or to develop 
new mines. In the period 1960/1961, the capital cost to 
develop a new mine in the Southern coalfield of N.S.W. was 
$12 Million, for a mine designed to produce 4,500 tonnes of 
raw coal per day. A typical lease area had reserves of plus 
50,000,000 tonnes of coal. However the basic cost to 























Total cost/tonne F.O.B. $20.17 
Saleable cost/tonne F.O.B. $28.00-$30.00/tonne dry 
clean coal 
Profit $ 8.00-$10.00/tonne. 
This cost was based upon an output per man shift of some 
8.5 to 9.00 tonnes. 
The capital value of a typical operating mine at this time 
was some $12,000,000 with leases of coal in excess of 
60,000,000 tonnes on average for a single mine. 
With a potential selling price of $28/30 per tonne this 
represented a 100% tax paid return of investment of 15% at a 
period where housing loans were at 4.8 to 5.0%. This position 
was that existing at the start of the introduction of 
continuous miners capable of cutting and loading at a rate of 
500 tonnes per hour, complemented by shuttle cars with a 
capacity of 8-10 tonnes. 
Mining leases were quickly granted by the N.S.W. and 
Queensland State Governments anxious to attract capital to 
develop the extensive coal resources available and also to 
help develop infrastructure at the shipping export ports. 
These States, in addition waived local rules to attract 
ancillary industries to the major population areas. 
Australia's small businesses in the form of back yard 
workshops responded to a demand for the supply of service 
items associated with the coal mining industry producing 
facsimile spares for imported equipment or in competition 
with local manufacturers who had invested in research and 
development of mining equipment. 
1.2 Effects of Increased Capita1 Expenditure and the 
Development of New Mines, Mamifacturing Industries 
The intensive mechanisation of the coal mining industry, 
coupled with re-construction of existing mines and 
development of new mines, resulted in a demand for an 
Australian share of the capital equipment manufacturing 
industry. Such capital equipment was of overseas design and 
required the minimum of local design and the overseas 
suppliers quickly established local agencies to market the 
equipment or set up an Australian branch of the parent 
company with minimum manufacturing facilities. 
Marketing comprised the review of clients' requirements 
without specification changes and allocation on a limited 
delivery basis so great was the demand. This, in the period 
1960-87, has produced a very erratic marketing system in 
Australia. 
To most Australian businessmen the words 'stars', 'cows', and 
'dogs' mean nothing at all as commercial terms, but according 
to Davenport (1983), these are the words that every chief 
executive should be thinking as he plans the company's growth 
over the next four years - (in 1987 this is so relevant in 
the coal mining and metal manufacturing industry). 
The above words are those used by the U.S. based corporate 
strategy group, Boston Consulting Group (BCG), to sort out a 
company's good performing areas. 
Davenport refers to the BCG report on Morien where a sales 
chart is divided into four parts: 
1. The stars, i.e. the good sales growth, large market 
share. 
2. Wildcats, good sales growth small market share. 
3. Cash cows, poor sales growth, small market share. 
Such was the demand for equipment that a solid background of 
suppliers of imported and locally manufactured capital goods 
evolved where each of the four conditions described could 
exist in harmony, in particular 1960-70. 
In typical Australian fashion alternative local sources 
evolved for the supply of service items and facsimile spares 
for the imported equipment. 
The coal mining industry in particular spawned the growth of 
small engineering/manufacturing industries dedicated to the 
supply of spare parts produced from drawings largely supplied 
by the colliery company maintenance engineers either by 
measurement or from spare part manuals. As these small 
companies were usually managed and owned by entrepreneurial 
tradesmen "having a go" there was a continual growth and 
decline of businesses destroyed by cut throat competition, 
creating the terms stars, wildcats etc. 
To meet the demands in the service industry field the small 
entrepeneur would pay over award rates, hidden bonus 
(overtime guarantees) and in exchange labour would accept sub 
standard conditions. 
Only three major overseas suppliers of continuous miners 
encouraged the Australian manufacture of continuous miners 
initially in the late 1970's, followed by a fourth in 1980. 
The designs were mainly overseas with Australian design input 
relating only to modification to suit local conditions, 
(Tague, 1966). (Research and Development expenditure to suit 
local needs). 
Although the ventures were initially successful, the impact 
of the 35 hour week and metal unions wage increases of 
1980-81 brought about the failure to compete in price with 
the overseas units and all have now reverted to mainly 
overseas importation. It is noteworthy that in the 
Australian manufacturing period the only development money 
spent on the equipment was for minor improvement. 
It is of interest to note that the see-saw principle of 
Product Petrification as reported in Californian Management 
Review (1982) began in 1982 where the four manufacturers of 
continuous miners in Australia won and lost orders for the 
supply of equipment to the same client due to the lack of any 
real major development by any one group. The only change of 
rate was in the introduction of solid state electrical 
control gear which initially was imported. 
Since 1982 the see-saw principle has applied in the industry, 
for example in the case of continuous miners the following 
has occurred (Knowles, 1982): 
Fox - Marietta - Developed local unit 1980 - sold 50 
units 1980-85 - now fully imported 
Joy - JCM - Manufactured under licence 1981-86 -
sold 200 units - now fully imported 
Jeffrey Heliminer - Manufactured under licence 1982-86 -
sold 78 units - now fully imported 
Noyes Miner - Part manufacture 1978-86 - 60 units 
sold - reverting to import. 
1.3 Fluctuating Research and Development (R & D) Budgets 
Australian expenditure on industrial research and development 
declined during the 1970's from approximately 1.2 per cent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1973-74, to about one per 
cent in 1976-77, and is now probably somewhat less than one 
per cent of GDP. Thus, approximately $1 billion is spent 
annually, with governments providing about 60 per cent of the 
funds, and undertaking in their own agencies approximately 40 
per cent (in terms of expenditure) of the overall national R 
& D effort. 
In the early 1970*s, some 4,500 technical people were 
employed in industry in R & D. Towards the end of the 
decade fewer than 3000 people were similarly employed. It 
seems that few manufacturing firms have concerted research 
programmes, and that most of these firms engaging in R & D 
are overseas-controlled although it may have been expected, 
perhaps, that these companies would have had greater access 
to foreign R & D . It may be that much of the R & D carried 
out in Australia consists of modifying foreign developments 
for the local market. 
The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation (CSIRO) is a statutory body, established in 
1949, It is the largest research organisation in Australia, 
with an annual budget of approximately $200 million. Much 
of its research effort focuses on aspects of primary 
industry, although increasing attention is being devoted to 
areas of secondary industry. 
The Australian Government has various incentive schemes to 
encourage R & D , including the Industrial R & D Grants scheme 
which dispensed $24 million to industry in 1978-79. 
Payments of 50 per cent of project costs, up to a maximum of 
$500 000 per annum per company, are made to approved firms. 
Most of today's research is carried out by scientific teams 
working in research laboratories rather than by independent 
inventors of the breed of Thomas Edison, Samuel Morse or 
Alexander Graham Bell. Managing scientific personnel poses 
special challenges. They are professionals who resent too 
much cost control. They are more interested in solving 
scientific problems than in coming up with marketable 
products. Yet companies are making some progress in 
impressing a stronger marketing orientation in their 
scientific personnel. 
Tight money in recent years has led many companies to 
concentrate more on pursuing minor product improvements 
rather than gambling on major innovations. In the past, 
such major foreign companies as Du Pont, Bell Laboratories 
and Pfizer would invest heavily to find major breakthroughs 
and were successful in many cases. Even these companies 
seem to be pursuing more modest goals today. Most companies 
are content to put their money into improving antiperspirant 
deodorants, car restyling and new soft drink flavours. Some 
part of every R & D budget is spent simply to match or copy 
competitors' products rather than striving to surpass them. 
1.4 Increased Regulation of Technological Change 
Technological change is encountering more regulation and 
opposition than ever before. As products get more complex, 
the public needs assurance of their safety and health. 
Government agencies have responded by expanding their power 
to investigate and ban new products that might be directly 
harmful or have questionable side effects. Thus the 
Australian Federal Department of Health has issued elaborate 
regulations governing the scientific testing of new drugs, 
resulting in 
(1) much higher research costs; 
(2) lengthening the time between idea and introduction and 
(3) driving much drug research to other parts of the world 
where regulations are less stringent. 
Safety and health regulations have substantially increased in 
other areas such as food, motor vehicles, clothing, 
electrical appliances and construction. Marketers must know 
these regulations and take them seriously when proposing, 
developing and launching new products. Many U.S. companies, 
such as the marketers of cyclamate sweeteners, have had the 
experience of spending millions to find and launch a new 
product only to have a government agency pronounce it unsafe 
and force its withdrawal from the market. 
Technological change is also meeting opposition from 
antitechnologists who see large scale technology as 
destroying many of the values and aspects of society which 
they cherish. They see technology as threatening to destroy 
nature, privacy, jobs, personal contacts, simplicity and even 
people themselves. Some sceptics have adopted Schumacher's 
philosophy, that "Small is Beautiful" and have replaced cars 
with bicycles, synthetic food with organic food and fancy 
clothes with denim clothes. They have opposed the 
construction of new chemical plants, high-rise buildings and 
recreational facilities where they believe these threaten to 
destroy existing ecological balances. They have clamoured 
for official groups to perform technological assessment on 
new technologies before permitting them to be commercialised 
in this society. 
In September 1987, the Federal Minister for Industry held a 
series of discussions with leaders of industry and 
educational bodies to examine the role of education in 
industry. Participants from government, industry and 
education all agreed that Australia needs some system of 
technology assessment and futures studies, but many 
participants were sceptical that this could be effectively 
incorporated into Australia's existing political system. 
Of a list of 20 possible studies for corporate and national 
planning in Australia to the year 2000, those ranked as 
having top priority were: 
Implications of developing relations with South East 
Asian countries for Australian economy and society. 
Alternative energy supply/demand scenarios for Australia. 
Changing world trade relations and structural adjustment 
in the Australian economy. 
Youth unemployment and socio-economic change in 
Australian society. 
Technology, productivity and employment in Australian 
manufacturing industries. 
Growth prospects for the mineral and metal processing 
industries in Australia. 
Research and development priorities and innovation 
opportunities and needs in Australian industry. 
Petroleum energy conservation options in transport to 
the year 2000. 
Alternative economic, social and technological futures 
for Australia. 
Socio-economic impacts of new computer information and 
communication technologies. 
Marketers must understand the technological environment and 
the nuances of technology. They must be able to envisage 
how technology can be connected with human needs. They must 
work closely with R & D people to encourage a market 
orientation to their research. They must be alert to 
possible negative aspects of any innovation that might harm 
the users and bring abour distrust and opposition. 
1.5 Definition of Problem 
The growth of the British Empire was based initially on the 
ability of the early colonists to exploit raw materials as a 
feed for the factories in the mother country. An abundance 
of coal, water and to a minor extent iron ore coupled with an 
expanding industrialised population saw the emergence of the 
leading industrial nation of the 19th century. The 
manufacturing industry diversified to supply the expanding 
colonies with a nearly captive market and by the beginning of 
the 20th century the United Kingdom stood at the same 
position in world trade where Australia now stands today. 
Allowing for two world wars the indisputable fact is that the 
United Kingdom relied too heavily in heavy industry with only 
the midlands emerging as the base for new consumer 
industries. The new industries were highly capitalised and 
became a vulnerable target for union pressure as well as for 
the imposition of old work to rule practices. 
Australia, or rather the people must examine the example 
given and the role of management and unions needs to be 
integrated without the loss of discipline. A fair day's 
work for a fair day's pay is better presented as a fair day's 
work can be rewarded by payment such that the worker has a 
direct interest in the creation of a reasonable profit margin 
which also generates capital for re-investment. 
Australia needs a market manager, not only to expand the 
sales of existing export earning products mainly raw 
materials but to initiate a review of the nations potential 
as a producer of goods indirectly associated with base 
products and geared to the 21st century. 
This is the general problem areas with which this thesis is 
concerned. 
1.6 Scope of Work 
Three projects are presented in order to produce a case for 
the above endeavour and to attempt to provide a guide to 
management and future managers in order to produce a new 
Australia with a balanced economy able to offset the 
challenge from resource rich underdeveloped nations. 
The case study examples will be restricted to coal and gold 
commodities as well as representation of Australian mineral 
resources. The investigation presented would deal with all 
the major phases of resource development and associated 
industries. 
CHAPTER 2 15. 
MANUFACTURING OF MINING EQUIPMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1950 the first continuous miners were introduced into the 
Australian deep coal mining industry. However, agreement 
was not reached between the mines, government bodies and the 
operators to prevent the extraction of pillars by mechanised 
systems mainly continuous miners and shuttle cars. This was 
essential to produce the bulk outputs now required by the 
market forces locally and the expanding export market. 
After very hard bargaining between unions and employees an 
agreement was finally reached which paved the way for the 
application of continuous mining methods in 1954 in New South 
Wales collieries. In 1959 some sixty-three percent of coal 
was mechanically loaded underground and by 1960 nearly 
ninety-four percent of underground coal was loaded by 
mechanical loaders. Conventional pick up loaders and track 
mounted coal cutters formed thirty-five percent of the 
ninety-four percent value and this was phased out by 1965 
when ninety-five percent of all underground coal was loaded 
by continuous miners into shuttle cars as shown in Table 2.1. 
(JCB, 1960). 
Face outputs per shift from continuous miners was on average 
one hundred and eighty tonnes in pillars compared with eighty 
tonnes previously track mounted from cutters and pick up 
loaders. This increase highlighted the shortcomings of the 
track mounted car systems used to convey the coal from the 
face. 
The use of track mounted equipment increased the face labour 
since trackwork required to be installed for the cutter, the 
pick up loader and finally the rail mounted car. In addition 
a battery locomotive and crew backed up the pick up loader by 
hauling the cars to and from the face. 
Table 2.1 
N.S.V. COAL CUT AND LOADED BY CONTINUOUS MINERS (OOP's tonnes) 
NORTH WEST SOUTH TOTAL N.S.W. 





232 (2.8) 232 (2.8) 
437 (5.2) 354 (4.2) 
664 (7.5) 408 (4.6) 
926 (10.4) 642 (7.2) 
44 (2.7) 44 (2.7) 





700 (17.6) 932 (6.7) 
1014 (22.2) 2006 (13.7) 
1157 (24.6) 2595 (17.1) 





Note:- By June 1960 coal cut by continuous miners was 39.2% of the NSW total and a total of 69 continuous miners were 
in operation. Two firms supplied continuous miners, Jay Manufacturing and Lee Norse. All continuous miners 
unit equipment, shuttle cars, loaders, feeders, breakers, was imported of which 95% was from the U.S. 
By June 1960 nearly 41.5% of all NSW coal was cut and loaded by continuous miners, 
using arc wall cutters and mobile loaders, whilst 7.2% was level loaded. 
51.3% was cut and loaded 
The initial change in this system was the adoption of the 
panel conveyor and trackless mining equipment. The panel 
conveyor in many cases up to 1965 delivered to a car loading 
station. This high level of belt conveyor utilization in 
the coal mine encouraged some Australian manufacturing 
companies to start home building of belt conveyors. Other 
equipment to receive attention included: mine cars, diesel 
tractors and free steered vehicles. 
This chapter is intended to examine the reasons for the 
manufacture of these products and the current position in the 
Australian mining scene. Also discussed are: after sales 
business and new business of spare parts. 
2.2 Manufacturing of Men and Material Handling Equipment 
2.2.1 Belt Conveyors 
The use of belt conveyors for panel conveyor development 
and extraction was the most efficient means available 
for coal transport. The coal could then be loaded into 
rail mounted cars for hauling to the surface by 
locomotive haulage. New mines in the development stage 
were planned on the basis of total conveyor application 
to the surface. 
From 1950 to 1960 the majority of standard conveyor 
drive heads used in Australia was sourced from the U.K. 
with some equipment imported from the U.S.A. Other 
drives consisting of a standard reduction gear box and 
locally manufactured conveyor pulley were installed and 
in the main there was a need for a locally designed 
series of standard drive heads for use in underground 
situations. In addition to this requirement the 
capacity of panel conveyors to meet the new generation 
of continuous mining units necessitated a new approach 
to conveyor structure design. 
From American coal mining experience the need arose for 
light weight conveyor structures readily demountable and 
easily transported and erected to complement the 
increased productivity of a continuous miner under 
loading conditions. The conveyor drive head sourcing 
was based upon mainly U.K. suppliers and so also was the 
conveyor structure supply using closed structure and 
cast iron idlers. 
The capacity of the U.K. conveyor structure was based on 
speeds of 1.5 to a maximum of 2.1 metres per second 
which necessitated wide belts to accept the peak loads 
of 600 tonnes/hour possible. Dynamic balance of idlers 
available off the shelf could not permit higher speeds 
unless machined at a high cost. 
At the instigation of mining operators an Australian 
standard of "stringer" structure was investigated by 
some six suppliers of conveyor equipment in Australia of 
whom only two had close underground mining experience. 
This experience being some four to five years. The new 
standard demanded that conveyor idlers be locally 
manufactured to a tolerance such that speeds of 3.0 to 
3.5 metres per second could be achieved using fabricated 
idlers made from selected tube and within a tolerance of 
dynamic balance of 6 gm metres when tested at design 
speed. In 1960 and through to late 1961 underground 
testing of samples of all suppliers of locally made 
conveyor structure was conducted to determine the 
reliability of the concept. This test resulted in the 
design of the 'Australian Standard Conveyor Structure' 
used in ninety-nine percent of mines until the late 
1970's. 
Contracts were placed with selected manufacturers based 
on the Standard Conveyor Structure Specification and a 
highly efficient conveyor manufacturing industry was 
established located in Sydney and Melbourne which 
supplied the fast expanding mining industry. 
In 1960 Australian Iron & Steel Pty. Ltd. installed the 
largest steel cord underground conveyor in the world, 
being some 1900 metres centre to centre with a lift of 
518 metres and a capacity of 600 long tons per hour. 
This was quickly followed by several similar 
installations and demonstrated the technical lead which 
Australian manufacturers had in conveyor technology. 
The design was 90% Australian input and apart from the 
steel cord belt all other equipment was manufactured in 
Australia. The conveyor structure was manufactured in 
accordance with the new Australian light weight standard 
and the load generated by the steel cord belt had 
minimum effect on the light weight structure after 12 
years when a belt fire destroyed the installed structure. 
In the period 1961 until 1980 a new generation of 
standard conveyor drive heads was also developed which 
catered for power ratings from 50kw to 400 kw using 
standard drives with speed ranges of 3.0 to 3.1 m/sec. 
Imports of conveyor drive heads and structure were less 
than ten percent of the market in underground coal 
mining. 
The high quality of equipment available for conveyor 
projects opened up an export market for Australia for 
material handling systems in New Guinea, South East 
Asia, South Africa, North America and South America. 
From 1969 to 1972 there emerged two Australian companies 
who could compete in the international market in this 
field from a technical viewpoint. 
Since 1980 however, the two major companies have since 
declined due to disputation in the metal industry by-
union activity and in 1985 the companies merged within a 
larger group which has failed to retain the market 
against overseas designs and importations. Staff 
losses have resulted in small manufacturing companies 
being formed by redundant design staff to manufacture 
barely disguised copies of conveyor drives and 
equipment. No major designs have emerged locally and 
the initiative in upgrading existing conveyor systems 
for which there is an expanding market has originated 
from overseas with subsequent importation of the 
equipment. 
2.2.2 Diesel Tractors, Man Cars and Free Steered Vehicles 
A little recognised application of diesel engines for 
off track vehicles was developed in Newcastle, 
Australia, in the form of a "Minesmobile". Developed 
from an agricultural tractor the unit quickly became a 
standard item of equipment in all Australian underground 
coal mines. Simultaneously, a rail mounted diesel man 
car was developed capable of speeds of 14 Km/hour and 
with a capacity for 14 men including the driver. Other 
systems introduced were Free Steered Vehicles. These 
innovations saw a 7% increase in output per unit shift 
in New South Wales mines in general. 
Off-track mainly wheeled tractor was called Free Steered 
Vehicles in America and Europe. The major overseas 
raining equipment manufacturers have adopted this 
description to by-pass proprietary rights of the 
Australian innovators. This can be attributed to the 
fact that between 1965 and 1986, almost 90% of the 
deisel engines used in underground vehicles were 
imported from Abroad. These were then locally modified 
to meet the ventilation requirements of the Department 
of Mineral Resources, N.S.W. 
Initially, only four firms in Australia supplied the 
local market but this was then increased to eight by the 
entry to the market of some overseas based companies 
with Australian subsidiaries. Australian designed 
vehicles modified with service facilities being marketed 
overseas by the parent company from overseas. These 
products are marketed under the company names without 
benefit to the Australian originators. The locally 
built unit became under pressure to compete in Australia 
with an imported vehicle originally developed in 
Australia because of lower labour cost from overseas. 
All of these items are major capital expenditure items 
which required the minimum of design staff in the local 
office and therefore market potential evaluation tended 
to be controlled by job wise buyers, who in turn were 
entrepreneurial in outlook. Market saturation from 
1960 onwards until 1982 was never a consideration and 
the fringe service industry thrived with no major input 
in development. 
2.3 After Sales Business - Spares 
To illustrate the need for definite objectives in the 
development of a modern technologically sound manufacturing 
industry it is appropriate to review the after sales 
activities subsequent to the completion of a contract or 
order for equipment. 
2.3.1 Award Conditions of an Order or Contract 
The award of a contract on an order for the supply of 
equipment is normally accompanied by a request from the 
client for a recommended list of spare parts and 
consumable items. The client will require such data to 
accurately assess tenders from the financial startpoint 
and also from the availability life of the equipment 
being offered. 
2.3.2 Major Spares, Consumable Spares 
The items of equipment classified as major spares, for 
example, gear units, motors, large pulleys or shafts can 
be placed in inventory stock at the client's discretion 
and only chargeable when required. Consumable spares 
on the other hand are normally purchased on a 
maximum/minimum basis when delivered. 
The Spares listed form part of the original design 
package prepared by the supplier and as such is not 
simple to copy if the basis of the design is not known. 
2.3.3 Patent Rights 
It is not always in the best interest of a supplier to 
supply detailed design drawings on calculations in open 
tender conditions. For example, in the case of a bulk 
winder the purchase of a spare skip is essential to the 
effective maintenance of the system as this item is a 
highly specialised unit of design not readily copied. 
Similarly major drive shafts are not readily copied 
without detailed design criteria including steel 
specification and machining on heat treatment. Since 
the above items are normally long life items they are 
purchased or provided for at the placement of order on 
contract. 
2.3.4 Effects of Loss of After Sales Business 
In many cases the original supplier will not receive a 
second option for a similar equipment package and 
Figure 2.1 (a) shows the typical example of the 
effect of a mine winder contract on the sales of company 
F. where the contract improved sales figures only over 
the construction and final commissioning period. The 
company invested in research and development to meet 
local specific requirements with overseas technological 
assistance. Sales of consumable spares passed to local 
suppliers as soon as commissioning was complete whilst 
these suppliers received the benefit of research and 
development by the original suppliers. This results in 
product design stagnation since the technology is not 
advanced and the manufacture in this particular example 
dispensed with the design staff with the winding 
experience due to lack of orders. 
Figure 2.1 (b) illustrates the problems associated 
with the conveyor industry where in the case of mining 
the major capital equipment consisting of the drive 
head, take up motors and control gear form only 40% of 
the total cost. The consumables, namely idlers and 
belting form 17% and 23% of the original cost 
respectively. 
In the case of idlers the local small manufacturer will 
under cut the original supplier for spares since the 
design can not be patented effectively. No research is 
required to copy the idlers and therefore a local 
workshop can operate on a small 1/2% replacement 
delivery schedule to an operation. 
Australian major conveyor manufacturers pioneered 
the design of lightweight balanced idlers but because of 
pirated idler spares the research and development of new 
designs has ceased only to be replaced by overseas 
designs manufactured under licence to the parent company. 
Figiire 2.1 (c) shows a similar trend in the design 
supply and manufacture of transport equipment for the 
mining industry. In this case the original designers of 
a new or prototype vehicle have failed to obtain the 
market position due to the undercutting of the overhaul 
and repairs market by local workshops. 
Figure 2.2 shows company F statistics highlighting the 
steady rise of contracts or orders in the period 
1967-1980 corresponding to a similar rise in research 
and development. The effects of the growth upon the 
companies vulnerability to trade union wages pressure is 
shown and is the subject of study in Chapter 3. 
These figures are graphic confirmation of the 
continually high failure rate of small manufacturing 
businesses which can be recognised as wild cats etc. 
(Devenport, 1983). In addition, the concern at 
government level cannot be more clearly shown as 
evidenced by their initiatives in forming a research and 
development association. The need for effective 
marketing is also identified by the loss of prospective 
overseas markets due to undercutting procedures. 
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2.4 Summary 
The need to understand the market forces and its behaviour as 
practised in Australia is one of the prime characteristics of 
successful management. A product manufacturer may not last 
long unless there exists a continual and healthy need for its 
products and therefore it is important that a manager should 
be aware and appreciate the lack of return of research and 
development funding due to pirated non genuine spares. The 
manager must understand and appreciate the challenges ahead 
with regard to the marketing of its products and must 
therefore allow for such eventualities and must be able to 
overcome by better product design. 
CHAPTER 3 
INDUSTRIAL UNRESTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
3.1 Introduction 
The Australian metal manufacturing industry in the first 
three decades of this century was basically a service 
industry to the domestic market depending largely upon 
imports of capital equipment from Europe to service coal 
mining, metal mining and agriculture. During this period 
the development of the two major iron and steel producing 
areas of NSW at Wollongong and Newcastle, following the 
closure of the Hoskins iron and steel works at Lithgow, 
marked the beginning of a soundly based heavy industry. New 
coal mines were developed and these in turn brought a demand 
for metal products together with a demand for consumable 
spares which could be manufactured locally. 
After the second world war the B.H.P. steel works at 
Wollongong and Newcastle were rapidly expanded to meet the 
population expansion of that period. Australia was no 
longer an island protected by distance as a result of 
developments in aviation and she could no longer rely on the 
mother country for protection. 
The steel industry was by 1960 in a position to supply 80% of 
the raw metal required for the domestic and for the 
industrial market. Metal working companies were quickly 
established to respond to the expanding market. This period 
saw the emergence of major trade unions who quickly set out, 
by the process of industrial disruption, to demand a share of 
the boom profits made in a labour starved economy. The coal 
mining industry, expanding by the demands of the expending 
Japanese market, encouraged metal manufacturing companies to 
invest in servicing that industry. 
Company F is an example of a manufacturing company developed 
for the purpose of servicing the mining industry and this 
Chapter deals with the rise and decline of the company due 
mainly to industrial unrests. 
3.2 Background to Company F 
Company F was formed initially by coal mining entrepreneurs 
operating very successful mines in Burragaron Valley, NSW. 
Some of these mines are still in operation today. To 
diversify the company interests a small manufacturing 
industry was set up which was designed to service the company 
mines. Since the background of the organisation was coal 
mining the expertise and experience gained resulted in the 
mining machinery offshoot expanding into the open market 
mainly in the conveyor area initially. This expertise was 
demonstrated by the completion of a conveyor system designed, 
manufactured and installed by the manufacturing branch in the 
Burragaron Valley known as a zig-zag conveyor complex. 
(Ref. Colin Smith). 
From this beginning there developed a leading mining 
machinery manufacturer in Australia which finally competed in 
open market tenders for major works in Australia and overseas 
projects. Figure 3.1 shows the management structure of 
Company F in 1960. 
The coal mining and manufacturing branches of the company 
were sold off to an American Investor in 1965 and the coal 
mining operation was separated managerially from 
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FIGURE 3.1 MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF COMPANY F IN 1960 
From the period 1965 to 1969 the manufacturing branch of the 
American owned company was a leading exporter of conveyor 
equipment and materials handling equipment exporting in South 
East Asia and North Africa. Figure 3.2 shows the 
management structure subsequent to takeover. 
The success of the company attracted the attention of 
overseas investors who in 1969 were actively diverting large 
capital resources from mainly unstable political areas into a 
booming Australian economy. A Canadian firm successfully 
bid for the F Manufacturing Company and combined other 
locally owned subsidiaries into one organisation. The 
management structure was maintained as in Figure 3.2. 
The manufacturing branch continued to expand into the 
Australian and overseas market and obtained manufacturing 
licensing from the USA and the UK for major capital equipment 
required to develop the expanding coal industry. These 
items of equipment involved packages of $18 million for 
single orders in some cases. Figure 3.3 shows the 
management structure of the company with staff dedicated to 
marketing and this highlights the urgent need at that time 
for a market plan for the Australian exporters. 
The growth of Australian based metal manufacturing and export 
business presented a new challenge in the field of marketing 
since this area was new to the emerging companies, where a 
surplus of manufacturing capacity was envisaged as the 
capital investment programmes in steel, iron and to a lesser 
degree coal mining slowed down in 1972. Company F continued 
to prosper throughout the period between 1970 and 1980 with 
orders being at an all time high as shown in Figure 3.4. 
Table 3.1 shows the details of company F in 1980. Table 
3.2 lists the employees on payroll of the Company F as of 
25th February, 1981. 



















FIGURE 3 . 3 MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF COMPANY F IN 1 9 7 2 
Table 3.1 
Details of Company 'F' 
Company "F" Manufacturing (1980) 
Capital 
Manpower 
Export Contract Values 
Local Contract Values 
A$ 9,876,000 
264 
A$ 150,000,000 (1970-1980) 
A$ 11,000 (Being completed) 
Equipment Manufacturing Capacity - Types of Equipment 
1. Conveyors, driveheads, structure, ancillaries. 
2. Drilling and exploration. 
3. Continuous miners, shuttle cars, ration feeder breakers. 
4. Longwall - Agency and Joint Venture with leading U.K. based 
Company. 
5. Railway equipment - diesel, diesel/electric, battery 
6. Tractors, trailers, free steered vehicles. 
7. Automotive industry specialised equipment for material handling. 
8. Mine fans. 
9. Mine winders. 
10. Steelworks/Blast furnace material handling. 
11. Aircraft industry - 747 tractors. 
12. Sub-contracts Ford, GMH and USA - small fabrications, specialised 
castings. 
Table 3.2 
Employees of Company F as at 25.2.81 
Section Tradesmen Apprentices 
Fitting Shops 43 18 
Machine Shops 47 17 
Fabrication Shop 86 22 
Press Shop 27 3 
Painters 7 -
Electricians 8 3 
Store 16 -
Yard 6 -
Total 240 63 
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METAL MANUFACTURING 
W A G E I N D E X S C A L E 
F I G U T 4 R E 3.4 THE EFFECT OF THE INCREASED WAGES A N D 
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES O N THE PERFORMANCE OF 
COMPANY F BETWEEN 1976 AND 1986 
3.3 Industrial Disputes 
During the successful years of the company F operations, an 
industrial dispute occurred spanning over a period of four 
years (between 1977 and 1981). This dispute occurred 
between the Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union and the 
Australian Metal Manufacturing Industries. 
The Unions had been, for some 3-4 years, campaigning for the 
introduction of a 35 hour per week practice which was not 
acceptable to the Metal Manufacturing Industry. As a 
consequence a number of companies were targeted for 
industrial unrest in the form of strikes, restrictive work 
practices, etc. Company F was one of several mining 
manufacturing companies targeted for the industrial 
dispute. Appendix (a) describes the record of the 
industrial dispute in chronological order. 
This disputation placed company F in a very difficult 
position with regard to retaining the confidence of major 
clients who had placed a substantial order for engineering 
equipment. The relationship between the contractor and the 
clients is dealt with later in this chapter. 
As the campaign of industrial unrest dragged on the employers 
generally together with the Federal Government declared their 
opposition to the campaign. However this did not have any 
influence on the Union's attitude. Figure 3.5 shows the 
increased level of employee's lost days during the period of 
industrial dispute. 
On October 31, 1980, Metal Workers at a mass meeting 
throughout Australia voted overwhelmingly to call off the 35 
hour week campaign. This meant that virtually the whole 
Metal Trades workforce of 600,000 had dropped out of the 35 
hour week campaign, with exception of several mining 
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FIGURE 3.5 INCREASED RATE OF LOST WORKING DAYS DURING 
THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE PERIOD 
As neither side was prepared to make any concession, the 
issue was referred to the Australian Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission. The commission sat for hearing on 
Monday 10th November 1980 at 2.20 p.m. The Commission was 
headed by Mr. Commissioner Bennett, Also present in the 
hearing were representatives of the following: 
The Metal Trades Industry Association; 
The Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union; 
Electrical Trades Union; 
The Australasian Society of Engineers; 
Federated Ironworkers Association. 
The Commissioner Mr. Bennett advised that the present dispute 
was contrary to the established agreements and advised that 
for the trade unions to make applications to the commission 
for a variation of the existing awards of 40 hours of working 
week or alternatively to fall in with whatever the ACTU 
decides, (that is the 35 hour week must be decided by 
arbitration and not by strikes). Appendix A|3 contains the 
transcrips of the proceedings of the Australian Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission. (Federal Government Archives, 
1980). 
Following the Arbitration's statement Company F submitted a 
proposal to end the campaign and return to the normal working 
situation. At the meeting with Shop Stewards the F 
Manufacturing Company proposed the following: 
An immediate review of the over-award payments to the 
employees. 
Resolving any disagreement about the holding of the 
Christmas Party as soon as possible. 
In return the Company F requested that the Shop Stewards put 
to the vote that "The employees of F Manufacturing Company 
follow the rest of the Metal Trades Workforce of 600,000 
throughout Australia and drop 9 day / 70 hour fortnight 
campaign until the A.C.T.U. Union Executive can find a better 
way of conducting the campaign." 
The proposal was rejected by the Shop Stewards which meant 
the status quo situation. The Shop Stewards also demanded 
that the company stop communicating with its employees by 
letter in future. 
As the dispute continued to drag on the Company F notified 
the Arbitration Commission of the continuing existence of the 
dispute on the Company's shop floor. Appendix A.3 
contains the details of the submission by Company F to the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission on 23rd February, 
1981. 
The Conciliation and Arbitration Commission sat for hearing 
on the 11th March, 1981. Commissioner Bennett said that he 
had found that sometimes it was possible to make suggestions 
to parties in a dispute that might lead to settlement. The 
Commissioner indicated that this dispute was a serious one 
and was affecting both the company and the employees. 
Commissioner Bennet made the following recommendations: 
(ACAC, 1981). 
1. There is to be a resumption of work on the basis of the 
situation as existed 17th December, 1980. 
2. The Company is to withdraw its notice of the 18th 
December, 1980 with respect to annual leave. 
3. The Company is to withdraw its notice of the 11th 
February 1981 with respect to the collective refusal to 
carry out normal duties. 
4. He is prepared to arbitrate on the matters of: 
(a) Payment for ironworkers suspended for part of a day 
and continuing days in December, 1980 because of 
selective bans. 
(b) Payment for public holidays for ironworkers over 
the Christmas period. 
(c) Payment to employees for the period of time they 
have been stood down. 
5. Upon a return to work, the parties are to confer on 
items 2 and 3 of the Company's statement of the 10th 
March, 1981 as handed up to the Commission at its 
Hearing of the 11th instant. 
6. As to the matters to be arbitrated he indicated he had a 
heavy commitment list with the first day available being 
the 25th March, 1981. 
7. He set down for hearing at 2.15 p.m. on that day, the 
questions to be arbitrated. 
Following the Arbitration decision handed down by 
Commissioner Bennett, the Unions returned to work under the 
original condition of employment, i.e. 40 hoiir week. The 
damage of industrial unrest had become so deep seated that 
the company lost its credibility with clients. This 
resulted in the demise of the Company as a major supplier to 
the mining industry. The Company was later sold off and the 
industrial complex was sold and is now a series of small 
warehouses with no manufacturing taking place and with a 
total workforce of 14 employees. 
3.4 Contractual Obligation During Disputation Period 
As stated previously that the industrial dispute placed the F 
company in very difficult situations with various clients, 
the problem of meeting the deadlines for the supply of the 
products was becoming increasingly difficult to achieve. 
Company F maintained in contact with the clients, informing 
them of the latest with regard to the industrial dispute. 
Appendix.A.4 is a typical letter forwarded to the clients. 
Where an extension of time was sought by the contractor due 
to industrial troubles, one of the major client's first step 
was to recommend that the work be contracted out of the 
disputed arena in order to avoid prolongation. Such demand, 
if it was possible to achieve, would have been to the cost of 
the contractor since the client was uninvolved. Note, 
however that since a large trade union was Involved, it was 
feared that an embargo could be placed on any firm 
undertaking to do the work and this occurred when an attempt 
to place contract outside was made. 
Since this particular industrial section was not a dispute in 
a true sense (that is, the trade unions were not in direct 
dispute with Company F per se but they were in dispute with 
Australian Metal Manufacturing Industry as a whole and that 
the unions wanted to use company F as a precedent to achieve 
their aims,) the client therefore accepted that "force 
majeur" could be applied to permit some prolongation of the 
contract provided that the contractor would only claim the 
Consumer Price Authority increases for work completed but no 
claims for overtime or bonus payment would be recognised. 
From December 1977 until the completion of the contract in 
1981 the relation between client and contractor became 
increasingly strained due to the lack of progress on the 
project. 
Another major overseas client remained aloof from the site 
operations from an industrial point of view. The overseas 
country's local trade unions strongly supported their 
Australian Counterparts and generally operated on a go 
slow/overtime ban and intermittent stop work meetings similar 
to the tactics used at the base factory in Australia. 
It is worth noting that the contractor did not carry out any 
prelimary study on the views and intentions of the overseas 
client country's trade unions. 
The attitudes of the overseas client nevertheless can be 
described as being far from supportive. There were a number 
of instances where the overseas client attempted to force the 
contractor to transfer part of the work to overseas 
sub-contractors and basically accept conditions which would 
have created the precedent with the Australian Unions aim 
thereby achieving a fait accompli. Appendix'A >5 is a 
record of the progress report dealing with the overseas 
client's project. The overseas client's unsupportive 
attitude is shown in the letter subsequent to the meeting 4 
and 5 December, 1980 
3.5 Consequences of the Industrial Unrest 
With the continuation of the industrial unrest, even after 
the strike was called off, the following effects were noted: 
1. Company F began to loose contracts as well as failing to 
meet future contractual obligations. (Figure 3.4). 
2. The company re-examined its investment in manufacturing 
of mining equipment. 
3. A number of employees were retrenched due to the lack of 
new orders. 
4. The company lost its prestige in all its entirety and 
did not regain full operating capacity, eventually 
abandoning major contract opportunities. 
5. Export orders were lost and also imported equipment 
replaced the traditional Australian made equipment 
suppplied by Company F. 
6. Technical expertise has been lost and to-date much of 
the equipment supplied in major projects are overseas 
based. 
3.6 Conclusions 
Industrial actions should be avoided where there is no cause 
for such action through any fault of the employer. Such 
disputation as that dealt with in this chapter has had the 
following consequences: 
( i ) A decl ine in the technological know-how of the 
country. 
( ii) Undesirable balance of payments problems brought 
about by the fact that a high percentage of mining 
equipment is presently being purchased from 
overseas. 
(iii) Losses of job training for apprentices which 
demonstrates the effect on future availability of 
higher skilled workers. 
Following the disputation, F company performance continued to 
slide, to a present level of not more than a handful of 
employees involved with mostly maintenance operations as a 
serving role. 
The disputation led to the management restructure with the 
Managing Director at the time being invited to join the Board 
of the parent company, which subsequently headed the 
Australasian operations, with diverse interests. On such 
interest was gold, which is the subject of study in Chapter 4. 
CHAPTER 4 46. 
UPGRADING KIDSTON GOLD MINE -
A Development Challenge of a Low Grade Deposit 
4.1 Introduction 
Following the adverse effect that the industrial disputation 
has had on the company F performance, the parent company 
began to assess its position with regard to coal mining and 
manufacturing industry. Recognising the potential of the 
company F management, the parent company transferred a 
selected management staff to its headquarters. The managing 
director of company F becoming the managing director of the 
parent company, Australasian operations. The parent company 
had other interests which included lubrication products and 
base metal mining with special emphasis on gold mining. 
The first task of the new management structure of the parent 
company (called P company) was to conduct an in depth study 
on the future investment direction of P company. A decision 
was reached to invest away from coal and mining machinery 
manufacturing operations. The main factors considered were: 
- The poor return of manufacturing products caused by the 35 
Hour Week Campaign. (Figure 3.4). 
- A possible decline in the coal industry with Japan cutting 
prices for coal. 
- The declining value of the Dollar in Australia. 
Attentions were then focused on increased investment on gold 
exploration and mining in Australia. This increased level 
of interest in gold was due to: 
- Improvement in price of gold in world market against all 
other metals as shown in Figure 4.1. 
- The tax exemption of the gold raining operations in Australia 
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- Improved exploration technology available in the form of 
landsat coupled to advances in the field research 
technology opened the door to investors. 
- Availability of more advanced, high capacity earth moving 
and excavating equipment capable of mining deposits at 
much greater depth. Old mining areas were a ready made 
stepping stone particularly old alluvial developed workings 
which could be re-developed as deep open cut prospects. 
The tax exempt nature of the Australian gold mining companies 
produced a direct incentive and this, coupled with a real 
drop in wages cost over the past six years, has made for a 
low cost operation comparable with world costs. The trend 
has been to short term prospects initially with yields as low 
as 2.0 gm/t, but with a significantly low investment cost. 
This type of operation can be geared to fluctuating gold 
prices on the world market. 
Kidston Mine, whilst not in the very low capital cost 
category, is a prime example of a development exercise which 
has not only tackled the technical aspects but has examined 
and applied a social exercise in the field of human relations. 
The investment and profit analysis was not based on typical 
accounting procedures where a discounted cash flow exercise 
determines the viability of the project. A fresh 
alternative approach was to determine the projected commodity 
prices and then determine what the mine needed to look like 
in order to make it economically feasible. 
This chapter is concerned with the methods and procedures 
adopted for the development of the Kidston Gold Mine. The 
need for management decisions based upon expertly engineered 
operations carrying the minimum of contingency capital is 
described. This being the ultimate measure of the 
management, engineers and other professions which were 
engaged in the development of the mine. 
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F I G U R E 4 . 2 LOCATION OF KIDSTON GOLD MINE 
4.2 History of Kidston Gold Mine 
Alluvial gold at Kidston was first discovered in 1907 by a 
prospector Charlie Mack, after whom the mineralised zone 
initially worked was named. One of the richest patches of 
alluvial gold was discovered by Jack Wise after whom Wise's 
Hill has been named. Within several months, the field was 
reported to carry between 1500 to 2000 people. The field 
came to be known as "The Oaks rush Goldfield" after the 
nearby Oaks Station. (Figure 4.2). 
In May 1908, the goldfield was re-named Kidston after the 
then Premier of Queensland, the Hon. William Kidston. By 
1911 the alluvial deposits were quickly exhausted and the 
population dropped to about 600. Small scale open cut and 
underground mining continued with varying profitability. 
For example, in 1940 the Kidston Battery crushed a total of 
7,380 tonnes of ore for a return of only 20.062 kg (624 
ounces), i.e. one ounce per 12 tonnes. In 1948, 5.402 kg 
(168 ounces) were obtained from 1623 tonnes (i.e. one ounce 
per 10 tonnes) and as a result, the Kidston State Battery was 
closed down in 1949. A total of 1260 tonnes (45,000 ounces) 
of gold were reported to have been obtained from 200,900 
tonnes of ore mined at Kidston during this period. 
The first cyanide treatment plant was constructed at the Oaks 
Liability Company Mine in 1914 to exploit the lower grade ore 
available from open cut operations. A second plant was 
installed at the Kidston Syndicate Battery in 1915. In 1922 
a State battery was erected at Kidston and this continued 
operating until 1949 when operations ceased. 
From 1922 onwards the output of ore dwindled to 6029 tonnes 
in 1939 from a total of 22 mines producing only 22.99 kg. 
(715 oz) of gold roughly 1 oz. per 10 tonnes of ore rained. 
The social aspect of the Kidston development from the start 
of the boom is best appreciated from the Kidston school 
enrollment records Table 4.1. The school closed in 1955. 
In 1980 exploration for mining at Kidston was carried out by 
the Company P. An initial evaluation estimated 6.1 Mt of 
mineable ore grading at an average of 2.42 gm/t gold. The 
proven reserves stood at 34.6 Mt grading 1.86 gm/t gold and 
2.27 gm/t silver, together with an additional 10 Mt of 
probable reserves and some 20 Mt of possible reserves. 
4.3 Location, Geology and Reserves of the Mine 
The Kidston gold mine is located in Northern Queensland, some 
280 km. north west of Townsville. (Fig:ure 4.2). Two 
economic gold deposits have been identified on opposite sides 
of a near vertical breccia pipe. (Fig:iire 4.3). The pipe 
penetrated granitic and metamorphic rocks of a continual 
crust segment known as the Georgetown Block. The 
predominantly proterozoic basement rocks of the block have 
been subject to a number of both extrusive and intrusive 
magmatic episodes in the Proterozoic Carbniferous, Permain 
and Cainozoic periods. (Butler, 1984). 
Two sub-circular intrusive complexes of Permian age lie 15 km 
and 40 km respectively south of Kidston. These are the 
Lachaber granite and the Bagstowe Ring Dyke Complex. The 
Kidston breccia pipe lies on the line of centres of these 
complexes and may well be related genetically to the thermal 
event which generated them. 
Table 4.1 
Kldston State School Enrollment (1909 - 1930) 
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The Kidston breccia pipes is a zone of rock fragmentation, 
induced by pressure build-up and release of escaping 
volatiles generated by magma at depth. The zone is near 
vertical and is oval in plan, being some 1300 m. in a NE/SW 
direction and 900 m. NW/SE. The fragments range from very 
large to less than 10 mm. in size. In those parts of the 
pipe where the gold grades reach economic levels the 
fragments size ranges up to 300 mm., but is mostly less than 
100 mm. in maximum dimension. 
4.3.1 Mineralisation 
Gold and silver are disseminated within the breccias and 
in veins. The disseminated gold is contained in a band 
which lies close inside the pipe margin on the northern, 
eastern and south-western sides of the pipe. The band 
is generally less than 80 m. wide, but increases to 
about 120 m. on the north side (Macks-North zone) and to 
200 m. at Wise's Hill on the south-west side. The band 
dips inward, but at least at Wise's Hill it has been 
shown to dip shallower than the pipe margin at 
increasing depths. Figure 4.4 shows the plan of the 
Kidston deposit mineralised. The plan shows the 
oxidised transition and primary ore at Wises Hill. 
4.3.2 Reserves 
Evaluation of the deposits relied heavily on the results 
of diamond drilling programmes which totalled 22,273 m. 
in 145 holes as indicated in Figure 4.3. Proved ore 
reserves are defined as those ore blocks for which the 
grade has been estimated using six or more 12 m. bench 
composite values. Probable reserves are those ore 
blocks for which the ore grades has been estimated using 
either four or five composite values. Possible ore 
includes any block for which the grade was estimated 
using two or three composites, none of which were 
located within the block being estimated. 
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Table 4.2 shows the Proved and Probable ore reserves 
at Kidston Mine. The reserves were calculated based on 
a geostatistical interpretation of the mineral 
distribution and block values interpolated from assay 
composites using kriging techniques. These values were 
checked using manual polygonal estimation techniques. 
(Butler, 1984). 
4.4 New Approach to Appraising the Kidston Gold Mine 
Initial studies conducted on the possibility of reviving 
the Kidston mine concluded that the Kidston project was 
a relatively unattractive risk and therefore was 
rejected as uneconomic. Critical re-examination 
revealed that the rejection was based upon managerial 
inflexibility and traditionally over conservative 
methods of mine evaluation, construction, operation, 
project commodity prices, social problems and other 
contingency factors. A fresh alternative approach was 
taken which is described later in this chapter. 
Table 4.2 
Geological Reserves at Kidston Gold Mine 
Total Ore 
(tonnes) 
Trade of Ore 















4.4.1 Project Re-Evaluation 
The traditional method of project appraisal is to 
determine what the mine would cost and then to determine 
whether it would be feasible in relation to the 
projected commodity prices. Faced with the prospect of 
an apparently uneconomic project, the Company P decided 
to adopt a new approach: first to determine the 
projected cash inflow based on probable commodity 
prices, and then on the basis of this, to determine what 
the mine needed to look like. 
Studies conducted by Company P on the past evaluation of 
the project revealed unfavourable conservatism: almost 
every aspect of the infrastructure had been 
significantly over-estimated, sometimes by more than 
300%. Examination of the plans, specifications, bills 
of quantities and so on showed unjustifiable 
over-estimâtions of quantities on even such items as 
housing and dams. 
Scrutiny from 1981 to 1984 progressively reduced the 
capital cost estimate for the project from $180 million 
to $140 million. Manning level was reduced from 247 to 
154 while at the same time raising the proposed level of 
ore production from 7500 t/d to 14,000 t/d. 
Re-examination of the geological reserves showed a 
considerable amount of the more easily treated oxidised 
ore to be located on and surrounding Wise's Hill. 
Selective exploitation of this ore would enable the mill 
throughout to be increased similarly from 7500 t/d to 
14000 t/d. As a result it was proposed that during the 
first years of mining the bulk of the mill feed would be 
oxidized ore and from 1992 onwards, the mill feed would 
comprise 100% primary ore. This would permit an 
increased cash flow during the early days of production 
and reduce the payback period. 
4.4.2 The Kidston Gold Mine Town Vs. No Town 
The issue of single industry town sites vs. commuting to 
work site has been the subject of considerable 
sociological research both in Australia and overseas 
(Brealy and Newton 1977) and Newton and Brealy (1979) 
and Baker (1981). Neil (1982 a. and b.), Neil (1983) 
and Neil, Brealey and Jones (1982). 
Mining towns are expensive to construct and the 
possibility always exists for them to become 
psycho-social disasters. At Kidston, there was no town 
to speak of. The population comprised 11 people with 
an average age little over 75 years. About half a 
dozen dilapidated iron clad house-like structures serve 
as their homes. There was no store at Kidston, only a 
post box and a telephone box. it was therefore not 
necessary to find an economic alternative to a town that 
would improve the feasibility of the Kidston gold mine's 
prospect as a viable package. Cost of constructing an 
acceptable town to serve a mine with a possible life of 
around 15 years was yet another factor which led to the 
apparent economic unfeasibility of the Kidston project. 
4.4.3 Commuter Mining: the Concept of Fly in and Fly out 
Commuter mining was evaluated as a possible alternative 
to building a town. Special emphasis was focused on 
the concept of fly-in and fly-out with the mine workers 
to be recruited from Cairns, Townsville and the Atherton 
Tablelands. (Nogas 1976). Commuter mining offered 
the following advantages: 
i) Although the overall comprehensive costs of 
building a town and operating a commuter system are 
approximately the same, commuter mining changes the 
cost from a heavy front end capital expenditure to 
an ongoing operating cost which is distributed over 
the life of the mine. 
ii) Commuter mining enables better control over costs. 
iii) It provides better latitude over opening and 
closing the mine at short notice depending on 
favourable or unfavourable changes in commodity 
prices. 
iv) It overcomes the problem of deciding what is needed 
to make a "successful town", within the limit of 
what is economically feasible, given a mine life of 
15 years. 
v) The workforce, and most importantly their families, 
will not need to relocate away from family and 
friends. 
vi) A constructed mining town is likely, because of 
cost and remoteness, to lack many facilities 
available in an established town community. 
4.4.4 Labour Relations 
The initial trade union reaction to "fly-in fly-out" was 
negative. Subsequently, the Trade Union Movement agreed to 
the operation of a programme with further review and 
evaluation to take place. In November/December 1984, the 
company commenced hiring its operations labour, centering its 
activities out of the Atherton Tableland, in the Cairns 
Hinterland. 
4.5 Mining 
Mining commenced on the Wise's Hill orebody on November 1984, 
initially to provide waste material for the completion of 
roads, the crusher ramp and the mine stockpile area. As the 
orebody outcrops, only minimal stripping was required prior 
to the mining of ore. Consequently, waste was also removed 
from areas of future mining to satisfy the pre-production 
requirement for 125,000 t. of waste material. 
The mining operation is based on conventional shovel and 
truck techniques. Two P & H electric powered shovels fitted 
with 9.17m buckets, load 91 t. capacity Unit Rig Lectrahaul 
reardump trucks. Other mining equipment includes two rotary 
drills, two tracked bulldozers, one rubber tyred bulldozer, 
one grader and a water truck. Loading and hauling of ore 
and waste are carried out on a schedule of two twelve-hour 
shifts per day, five days a week. 
The average ore production was projected to be 2.74 Mt/y but 
was considerably higher than this in the early years because 
of the ability of the plant to process oxide and transition 
ore at a greater rate than primary ore. 
Waste removal will vary from 0.81 Mt. in 1985 to a peak of 
6.77 Mt. in 1922. All waste is trucked to dumps while ore 
is either delivered directly to the primary crusher or taken 
to a run-of mine dump, or a low-grade stockpile for later 
processing. 
4.6 Processing 
The ore is initially crushed in a primary gyratory crusher 
and fed to a 25,000 t. live capacity stockpile. Ore is 
reclaimed from the stockpile using vibrating feeders and is 
conveyed to a two-stage grinding circuit consisting of an 
8.23 m. diameter semi-autogenous grinding mill in closed 
circuit with screens, followed by a ball mill in closed 
circuit with cyclones. 
Sodium cyanide and lime are added to the grinding circuit. 
Figure 4.4 shows the flow chart for the Kidston treatment 
plant. 
The cyclone overflow is treated in two parallel cyanidation 
circuits, each containing a series of five mechanically 
agitated tanks. Additional lime and cyanide are added to 
the feed. 
The pulp is then pumped through two parallel, four-stage 
cyclone wash circuits. The coarse cyclone underflow is 
discharged from the fourth stage as tailing. 
The finer cyclone overflow pulp containing the precious 
metal-bearing solution, flows to two high capacity thickeners 
operating in parallel. The thickener overflow solutions are 
treated in two parallel carbon column circuits, each 
containing five stages in series. Gold and silver are 
absorbed on to activated carbon and the barren solutions join 
the plant reclaim water system. 
Thickener underflow pulps are pumped via trash screens to a 
single stream carbon-in-pulp circuit containing six 
mechanically agitated tanks. Barren slurry is discharged 
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The tailings containment area is designed for zero discharge 
to the environment with the process water being reclaimed and 
pumped back to the plant for re-use. 
Loaded carbon is ducted from the carbon columns and pumped 
from the carbon-in-pulp tanks to the desorption circuit for 
the recovery of gold and silver. Desorption is carried out 
using hot caustic soda solution under pressure through one of 
three available vessels. The precious metal-bearing 
solution is passed through a heat exchanger where it is 
cooled by the incoming solution and flows to electro winning 
cells where the gold and silver are deposited on steel wool 
cathodes. When fully loaded, the cathodes are processed by 
smelting to produce ore bullion. Barren solution is 
re-circulated through the heat exchanger and then via a 
heater to the desorption column. 
The desorbed carbon is transferred to a vessel for acid 
washing and is then processed through a reactivation kiln. 
The reactivated carbon is screened to remove lines, and is 
stored for re-use. Make-up carbon is attritioned and 
screened to remove fine lines before being added to the 
carbon circuit. 
The dore bullion contains approximately 58% gold and 37% 
silver and is shipped for custom refining elsewhere into 
"good delivery" bars of 400 oz. (12.44 kg), the gold bars 
being of not less than 99.5% purity and the silver of not 
less than 99.9% purity. 
The first dore bullion was produced on February 6, 1965 
Projected production for the first twelve months of full 
operation is 281,000 oz. (8,740 kg.) of gold and 164,000 oz. 
(5,100 kg.) of silver. This output will make Kidston 
Australia's largest producing gold mine. 
^•7 Financing the Project & the Foreign Investment Review Board 
The Foreign Investment Review Board's requirements for 
foreign-owned companies was yet another factor that reduced 
the attractiveness of the Kidston Gold Mines package. It 
affected how Company P was to go about getting equity and 
when to share float. 
The Foreign Investment Review Board required a 50% Australian 
participation in Kidston Gold Mines prior to a full scale 
development of the mine. Additional problems arose for the 
project at this point in time as a result of: 
. A substantial fall in the price of gold. 
. General decline in stock market confidence. 
. Possible introduction of a tax on gold. 
These market conditions made it difficult to obtain a partner 
or to gain Australian equity by way of a public float. 
Negotiations resulted in the Federal Treasurer giving 
Company P credit for its 10% level of Australian ownership in 
Company P Development. As a result, the Treasury required 
that only 45% of Kidston Gold Mines be sold to Australian 
interests in order that it complied with the Federal 
Government's foreign investment guidelines for new resource 
projects. 
Over the two to three years from 1980, determined efforts 
were made with little success to sell 45% of the property to 
Australian financial institutions and public companies. 
Potential partners were asked to contribute approximately $50 
million up-front and then support 45% of the remaining 
project costs. In return for a 63% investment in project 
cost, they were to receive 45% of the profit. 
According to this arrangement, their return on Investment 
would be approximately 8% on what they considered to be a 
high-risk venture. Naturally, Australian financial 
Institutions found the proposition unattractive. 
A different approach to the problem was therefore required. 
There was a need to selectively look for a company that would 
gain advantages from such a project other than by being a 
straight partner. Company P developed a position statement 
that defined the criteria that the potential partner was 
required to possess. It was necessary for the company to: 
. Be progressive and venturesome. 
. Understand gold in order to assist in the marketing of 
gold - perhaps through a Gold Futures Trading Division. 
. Be a financier so as to provide low interest rates -
perhaps through a Finance Division. 
. Possess a Construction Division with mine construction 
experience - preferably in Queensland in order to take 
advantage of the mine construction project. 
. Gain substantial tax advantages by operating the mine, 
recognising of course that this would divide the 
organisation and therefore add to the managerial complexity 
of the operation. 
The one company that fulfilled the above criteria was Company 
X. As a result, Company X was approached and a lengthy 
negotiation process commenced. In the final arrangement, 
Company X purchased a 20% equity in Kldston Gold Mines for 
$25 million. 
This allowed Company P to obtain approval from the Foreign 
Investment Review Board to commence construction of the mine 
on the understanding that the remaining 25% was to be floated 
to the public prior to production commencing. With the 
subsequent dramatic drop in the price of gold, the Federal 
Treasurer's approval was sought to partly fulfill the 
commitment to float in 1984 and to defer the remainder of the 
float to when it was hoped market circumstances would 
improve. Attention was drawn to the number of floats being 
shelved and others that had proceeded but were proving to be 
less than successful. 
The negotiations proved successful and the Government 
permitted Company P to float 10% in 1984 and the remaining 
15% within 6 months of the earliest date allowable under 
Stock Exchange regulations. Company X opted to float 5% of 
their 20% equity and the structure at the 1984 offering was 
as shown in Figure 4.6. 
The next problem to contend with was whether the float would 
be a success. Experience, history and the signs of the 
times were proving that leaving the float in the expert hands 
of the underwriters was no guarantee of success. In order 
to maximise the opportunity for success. Company P soon 
recognised the critical need to "sell" the float to the 
Australian public over and above the "order taking" approach 
generally adopted by underwriters in this country. 
Operation "sell" K.G.M. began. Every colleague, business 
associate, business acquaintance, personal acquaintance, 
friend, friend of friends, enemies and friends of enemies 
were phoned and were either persuaded, coerced or directed to 
buy K.G.M. shares that were about to be offered. The result 
was an overwhelming success. The float was 40% 
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4.8 Results and Conclusions 
The construction of the Kidston gold mine was completed 3 
months ahead of schedule at a cost reduced by some $50 
million from the original budget. The 12 month construction 
programme also included: 
. Upgrading of 80 km. of unsurfaced roadway including 
bridges and concrete causeways to deal with the flood prone 
nature of the area and make it an all-season road. 
. Building of a 21,000 megalitre dam across the Copperfield 
River and the laying of 22 km. of pipes and construction 
of booster stations. 
. Construction of 292 km. of 132 kV transmission line from 
Townsville. 
. Construction of motel-type accommodation and recreational 
facilities 5 km. north of the minesite. 
Upgrading of an airstrip to accommodate 24-hour per day 
all-season flight facilities. 
In its initial 12 months of operation the mine is projected 
to produce 9034.15 Kg. (281,000 ounces) of gold making it 
Australia's largest gold producing mine. During the first 
five years of operation, the projected annual average is 
6301.40 Kg. (196,000 ounces) of gold and 5015.40 Kg. (156,000 
ounces) of silver. This is already being reviewed with a 
view to upgrading. The present market value of Kidston is 
estimated to be in excess of $500 million. 
The payback period has been effectively reduced from 5 years 
to 1.5 years. The life span of the mine is to increase from 
the estimated 15 years to more than 20 years. Tables 4.3 
and 4.4 list the statement of changes in financial position 
and balance sheet at 31 December 1985 respectively. 
TABLE 4.3 STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL POSITION. 
KIDSTON GOLD MINES LIMITED. FOR THE YEAR 
ENDING 31ST DECEMBER. 1985 
1985 1984 
SOURCE OF FUNDS 
Net Profit/(Loss) for the year 50,759,003 
Add: Depreciation 9,590,330 
Income tax 285,000 
Amortisation of exchange losses 2,464,606 
Funds from operations 63,098,939 
Add: Proceeds from borrowings 
— Bank loans 859,636 
— Other borrowings 16,199,038 









APPLICATION OF FUNDS 
Fixed assets (net of exchange losses) 12,399,655 
Refundable deposit (4,111,560) 
Deferred foreign exchange losses 13,966,961 
Payment of dividends — common 6,250,000 
— preferred 3,904,935 
Repayment of loans 44,241,636 
Net effect of debt allocation between short and long term 2,018,256 
78,669,883 
Increase/(Decrease) in working capital 1,487,730 
Working capital at beginning of year (23,414,316) 





ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN WORKING CAPITAL 
Increase/(Decrease) in current assets 
Cash and short term deposits 4,096,686 
Trade receivables 3,577,791 
Other debtors and prepayments 12,657 
Inventories 5,301,246 
12,988,380 
Increase/(Decrease) in current liabilities 
Bank loans and overdrafts 22,077,302 
Other borrowings (6,694,879) 
Trade creditors 1,923,180 
Other creditors and accrued expenses (2,503,914) 
Amounts payable to related companies (3,301,039) 
11,500,650 











TABLE 4.4- B A L A N C C E SHEET, KIDSTON GOLD MINES LIMITED, 
A T 31ST DECEMBER, 1985 
1984 
























Share Capital and Reserves 
Issued and fully paid 
125,000,000 Ordinary shares 3 
1 Redeemable preference share 
(par value 20 cents) 
Asset revaluation reserve 
Accumulated Profit 12 
Current Liabilities 
Bank loans and overdrafts 4 
Other borrowings 5 
Provision for income tax 
Trade creditors 
Other creditors and accrued expenses 
Owing to related companies 
Non Current Liabilities 
Bank loans 4 
Other borrowings 5 
Fixed Assets 6 
Other Non Current Assets 
Investments 8 
Deferred foreign exchange losses 9 
Refundable deposit 
Current Assets 
Cash at bank 
Short term deposits 
Trade receivables 
Inventories 7 

























The accompanying notes form an integral part of these 
accounts. 
TABLE 4.4- Statement of Profit & Loss 
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER, 1985 

















Operating profit for the year 10 
Income tax expense 11 
Net profit for the year 
Accumulated Profit at 31 December, 1984 
Deduct: 
Dividends 12 











The accompanying notes form an integral part of these 
accounts. 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the Australian political climate the demand for a coal plan to 
market the product to retain price values is unlikely to succeed 
since the product must be consumed if produced. The goal must be 
to produce a review of reserves and a concrete development 
programme geared to exploitation of readily accessible reserves 
with a balanced research and development programme for deep mining 
geared to the 21st century. 
Gold production should be an integral part of the economic plan 
scheme for Australia. Since deep gold mining will not be highly 
productive unless new mechanisation methods are introduced in the 
next two decades, financiers must be encouraged to examine the 
relationship between two valuable assets where one can be 
recovered and stored in a vault and the other in situ. The slide 
of the Australian Dollar in 1986 produced an inflationary effect 
which prompted government intervention to prevent heavy selling of 
the Australian Dollar. This slowed the spiral but high interest 
rates coupled to a buoyant share market have again pushed the 
Australian Dollar upwards to remove the competitive boost which 
should have helped the mineral export industry. 
A formula for the mining industry marketing strategy must 
therefore be geared to the exchange rate i.e. "the price" and the 
sale of gold should be reflected in a corresponding rise in the 
sale of coal at a competitive price. 
The only solution to the problem is a major reduction in costs 
both at the mine and in government charges. The weaker coal 
mining operations in N.S.W. will falter with consequent reduction 
in state revenue, to the state railways, port handling authorities 
and ancillary supporting industries. Unemployment in the coal 
mining industry will occur and is occurring and massive capital 
injection cannot be justified nor solve the problem of over supply 
of coal in the world market. 
The scenario for marketing of gold and coal is on the one hand to 
produce more gold at a cheaper production cost and sell a product 
which carries no impediments in the form of specification, is 
easily transportable and can be stored indefinitely. 
On the other hand coal must be produced at a cost which is 
competitive with Chinese, Columbian and South African prices where 
labour charges are only 38% of cost against 60% in Australia. 
The coal must be either sold on a strict specification for export 
or simply marketed as a product with a wide application. For 
both cases the producers cannot continue to produce as loss will 
be inevitable. 
The 35 Hour/Week campaign and its consequences have resulted in 
the demise of the mining manufacturing industry. Skills are 
being lost and the consequent training of new apprentices is 
affected, contributing to the low skilled manpower source which is 
undesirable. 
The Arbitration system has not succeeded in solving industrial 
problems. 
The Kidston Gold Mine project is an outstanding example of 
management and unions working together, not being put off by past 
practices and recommendations. 
It is therefore recommended that: 
There should be a major reduction in cost both in the mine and 
government charges to permit a healthy exploitation of the 
resources; 
Increased emphasis on gold production as it is a product which 
carries no impediments in the form of specification. 
There should be a coal plan to achieve the conservation of 
coal to await future technology which will make the most 
efficient and environmentally acceptable use of coal. 
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Appendix A 1 (a) 
TO: Directors. 
FROM:- Executive Director, Company 'F'. 
SUBJECT:- 35 Hour Week Campaign - Proposed Response by Company. 
DATE:- 4th September, 1980. 
1.0 Background 
To ensure that the matter of the current situation with 
respect to the A.M.W.S.U.'s campaign for a 35 hour working 
week is put into proper perspective, it is essential that 
there be a full comprehension of the events that have shaped 
the industrial relations environment in which the Company is 
now in. 
Set down below in chronological order is a record of the 
events as mentioned. 
1.1 The first tangible indication that the 35 hour week 
would be the emerging industrial issue of the 1980's 
occurred in February of this year with the notification 
of a dispute at Union Carbide's Altona (Victoria) plant 
where members of the A.M.W.S.U. employed by Union 
Carbide demanded the company grant to them a 35 hour 
week. 
In addition, in the February issue of the A.M.W.S.U. 
journal. Federal Secretary Carraichael advised that 
certain amendments to A.C.T.U. policy by Congress had 
cleared the way for a shorter working week to become an 
industrial issue. He also advised that such a campaign 
in Australia would complement the International 
Metalworkers Federation's recent decision for a campaign 
for a shorter working week. 
It was also apparent that the electricity supply 
authorities in all States other than New South Wales and 
South Australia would be seeking a 35 hour week at the 
earliest possible time. 
1.2 By April, the M.T.I.A. had determined to commence a 
pamphlet/leaflet type education programme aimed at 
warning employees of the economic employment 
consequences of support for the action proposed by their 
respective union executives. 
As well, the first rumblings from the Queensland power 
workers seeking a 35 hour week were heard and the matter 
of the 35 hour week at Altona had been listed for 
further hearing in May before a Full Bench following a 
lengthy sit-in strike by A.M.W.S.W. workers. However 
it would appear that one of the reasons for the Altona 
Hearing having been deferred until May was that the 
A.M.W.S.U. was not ready to proceed. 
In addition, toward the end of April the A.M.W.S.U., 
A.S.E., F.I.A., F.E.D.F.A. commenced their compaign for 
a 37 1/2 hour week at Pilkington-A.C.I. 
On the 30th April the A.M.W.S.U.'s campaign for a 35 
hour week commenced. 
1.3 Throughout May an attempt was made by the M.T.I.A. to 
either bring the 35 hour week matter before the Full 
Bench of the Arbitration Commission and/or to use the 
national wage hearing as a forum for discrediting the 
campaign of the A.M.W.S.U. 
In spite of such efforts however, the A.M.W.S.U. 
campaign had taken hold to the extent that the majority 
of organisations, where members of the A.M.W.S.U. formed 
the dominant portion of the work group, were working 35 
hours on each fourth week of the month with overtime 
restricted to a maximum of eight hours on the other 
three weeks (and of course nil overtime in the short 
week). 
In the Pilkington-A.C.I. dispute the employers had told 
the Arbitration Commission that if the campaign was to 
continue they would not be able to compete with foreign 
companies. In response the union claimed that 
Australia already produced the cheapest glass in the 
world and could well afford a shorter week. 
1.4 In June and July the Arbitration Commission threatened 
to defer the National Wage Case unless the A.C.T.U. 
pulled back the metal unions' campaign for a 35 hour 
week. An attempt by the A.C.T.U. and the Executive of 
the metal unions to so pull back was framed in 
resolution form but when put to a mass meeting of metal 
union shop stewards, the combined A.C.T.U./Union 
Executives' resolution was defeated by a vote of 8 to 1 
against. 
The New South Wales Railways Unions represented by the 
New South Wales Trades and Labour Council arranged to 
see Premier Wran re a 35 hour week claim. 
Differences between the A.M.W.S.U., other metal unions 
and the A.C.T.U. saw S.E.C. Victoria workers going it 
alone on a 35 hour week compaign. 
In Western Australia, the Alcoa, Pinjarra dispute over 
the 35 hour week appeared likely to spread nationally 
within Alcoa and possibly to the extent that the entire 
aluminium refining industry could be threatened/become 
involved. 
The Federal Government involved itself in the campaign 
when it announced it would take positive action per 
medium of the P.J.T. against companies who looked like 
conceding to union demands. However Government threats 
of retaliatory action were seen generally as hollow in 
view of the wound down condition of the P.J.T. and the 
known length of time it would take for the conducting of 
an enquiry into the effect of shorter hours on prices. 
In addition two of the tobacco/food companies who had 
been about to make agreements for a shorter working week 
were able to negotiate with the Government for no action 
to be taken on the basis that their arrangements had 
been made prior to the issue of the edict. In spite of 
the above, however, any organisation hoping for 
favourable consideration by the Federal Government on 
any matter would be best advised to be sensitive to the 
Government's stated attitude to the shorter working week. 
By the end of July, power workers in Western Australia 
had been granted a 37 1/2 hour week and power workers in 
Tasmania had commenced negotiations for the same. 
The M.T.I.A. claimed success in its campaign against the 
35 hour week. 
The A.C.T.U., metal unions and the A.M.W.S.U. appeared 
to have split on the method of handling the 35 hour week 
campaign with the A.M.W.S.U. still prepared to go it 
alone. 
On the 30th July, 1980 T,A. Field Pty. Ltd. announced 
its intention of introducing a 37 1/2 hour week to its 
1,000 employees at Orange, Rockhampton and Brisbane 
respectively and Alcoa announced its intention to stand 
down 1,300 of its employees in Western Australia over 
the 35 hour week dispute. 
1.5 By August the dispute in the glass industry had 
developed to the extent that Ford and G.M.H. were forced 
to stand down 3,000 employees. The A.M.W.S.U. refused 
to allow arbitration of the 35 hour working week issue 
and had turned the Pilkington-A.C.I. dispute into an 
issue over redundancy pay. (Pilkington was eventually 
settled with an increased redundancy pay offer). 
The Alcoa, Pinjarra 35 hour claim had also turned into a 
wage claim which was settled by Arbitration with 
increases of $18.00 - $23.40 per week, plus back pay, 
and increased long service leave payments being granted. 
In both the Pilkington and Aloca disputes, the 35 hour 
week campaign continued unabated in spite of the 
concessions granted. 
Towards the end of August, the A.C.T.U. resolved as 
follows: 
- Quote -
(1) That at this point of time "an across the board" 
approach to reduced working time involving 
industrial action is inappropriate. 
(2) Unions in appropriate areas should seek in 
consultation with the A.C.T.U., to establish 
reduced working time by direct negotiation. 
(3) Priority areas should be determined and the maximum 
effort allocated to the development of campaigns in 
these areas. 
(4) That the plan of action for a shorter working week, 
involving concentrated involvement in the power, 
aluminium and other sectors as outlined be endorsed. 
(5) In accordance with this plan the A.C.T.U. will 
initiate a campaign of publicity and education 
commensurate with the magnitude and priority of the 
issue. 
- Unquote -
In addition Sir John Moore commenced the hearing of a 
claim for 35 hour working week for drivers employed by 
oil agents in the Northern Territory (similar to the 35 
hour working week granted to oil industry agents' 
drivers in New South Wales following the Leon Laidley 
dispute). 
Towards the end of August the F.I.A. announced its 
support for the A.C.T.U.'s push for a shorter working 
week in the aluminium industry. 
2.0 M.T.I.A. Advice 
On Tuesday 2nd September the M.T.I.A. was contacted to 
enquire as to their view of the situation in respect to the 
35 hour week campaign and was advised as follows: 
2.1 The A.M.W.S.U. campaign had settled down to 35 hours per 
week being worked in one week each month with no 
overtime in that week and a restriction of eight hours 
overtime per week in the other weeks of the month. 
2.2 On a national level the A.M.W.S.U. only was pushing the 
35 hour campaign with the F.I.A. and other metal unions 
having joined with the A.C.T.U. in its campaign (see 
above). 
2.3 The A.M.W.S.U. is to meet next Tuesday the 9th September 
to consider its position and the M.T.I.A. will be 
holding meetings on Monday and Tuesday the 8th and 9th 
respectively to do likewise. 
2.4 The M.T.I.A. had conducted surveys recently and had 
established that in a number of companies, employees 
were not engaging in the short week campaign. 
Unfortunately the association could not advise which of 
those companies had A.M.W.S.U. members as the dominant 
portion of the workforce. 
3.0 Company Survey 
From the 2nd to 4th September the company conducted its own 
survey contacting a number of local companies or 
organisations engaged in similar work and as a result gained 
the following impressions: 
3.1 One company only was in the situation of having some of 
its employees not following the campaign on the short 
week. This company was International Combustion. It 
did appear that at International Combustion the F.I.A. 
have split with the A.M.W.S.U. The company has had 
some difficulties with respect to overtime and in 
addition the A.M.W.S.U. has claimed a 2 1/2% wage 
increase. 
3.2 The majority of organisations that the company 
management contacted were found to be subjected to the 
standard campaign. Indeed even those companies which 
suggested that their employees were committed to the 
campaign with reluctance, were not prepared to forecast 
the emergence of an International Combustion situation 
as outlined in 3.1 above. 
3.3 In one circumstance only, that being (J) Manufacturing, 
did the company management establish that the A.M.W.S.U. 
had stepped up its campaign to the extent that the 
employees of (J) Manufacturing are absenting themselves 
one in every ten working days with overtime being 
restricted to 24 hours in every month. 
4.0 Implications - Prospects for the Future 
Following upon the above research and review it would appear 
that a reasonable interpretation of the information as 
outlined would be as follows: 
4.1 National events have limited effects on what may or may 
not occur in the various workshops/piants around the 
nation. Hence claims of success/failure by the 
A.C.T.U., A.M.W.S.U., M.T.I.A. etc., and the outcome of 
ideological differences between various unions etc. are 
of academic interest only to an organisation that finds 
itself in the unfortunate situation of being under siege, 
4.2 From the history of the disputes at Alcoa, 
Pilkington-ACI and Union Carbide, it would appear that 
the 35 hour campaign in each of those places created an 
appropriate environment for success by the unions with 
alternate claims. 
However the expensive concessions granted by the 
companies did not resolve the 35 hour working week 
issue. Indeed the A.M.W.S.U. has resisted all demands 
to have the 35 hour claim itself arbitrated. 
4.3 Shop stewards have had to work so hard to gain support 
for this campaign that their potential loss of face 
should they be unable to gain some success (even if 
minor) is considerable. Hence the campaign has 
resulted in: 
4.3.1 Reduced hours at T.A. Field Pty. Ltd. 
4.3.2 Increased wages at Alcoa. 
4.3.3 Redundancy payments at Pilkington - A.C.I. 
4.3.4 Wage increase claims at International Combustion. 
Etc. 
4.4 It would appear that organisations that have been 
selected to be the subject of a stepped up campaign are 
being chosen on something of an association basis. 
Examples of the above are: 
4.4.1 The electricity industries in States other than 
New South Wales and South Australia on the basis 
of what has happened in New South Wales etc. 
4.4.2 The oil agents' drivers in the Northern Territory 
on what has happened in New South Wales. 
4.4.3 The aluminium refining industry on what has 
happened with respect to the hours worked by 
those actually mining for aluminium. 
4.4.4 The claim against Union Carbide (as Altona is a 
petrochemical plant) on the basis of the oil 
industry. 
4.4.5 Possibly J Manufacturing on its association with 
mining industry-
If this is the case the prospects for F Manufacturing of 
course do not look good. 
4.5 Other variables to be taken into account in attempting 
to predict what may or may not happen in the future - in 
priority order - are: 
4.5.1 The dominance of the A.M.W.S.U. in the workplace. 
4.5.2 The degree of militancy of the A.M.W.S.U. 
4.5.3 The past industrial history of a particular shop. 
4.5.4 The reaction of a particular organisation to the 
campaign. 
4.5.5 The level of overtime previously 
worked/available and/or about which there is an 
exception. 
4.5.6 The nature of the market in which an organisation 
is a competitor. 
4.6 It would appear that: 
4.6.1 The eventuality of a 35 hour working week in the 
metal industry is as inevitable as the fact that 
the sun comes up in the morning. 
4.6.2 When the 35 hour week is Introduced there will be 
a real increase in costs of approximately 12 1/2% 
and a corresponding drop in productivity which 
will have a marked and dramatic effect on the 
viability of the metal industry. 
4.6.3 The campaign for the 35 hour week will continue 
for a considerable period of time with the 
possibility that in certain areas the current 
campaign will be stepped up. 
4.7 With the matters as raised in 4.6 above in mind, it 
would appear that from the week ending 5th September, 
1980 and thereafter, it behoves the management of F 
Manufacturing to take maximum advantage of the hours now 
available to us with the hope of maximising productivity 
relative to what may occur in the near/intermediate 
future, 
5.0 Management Approach 
If the Manufacturing organisation is to succeed in holding 
the line at the present situation it is important that the 
following be appreciated: 
5.1 In all disputes the specific if not selfish interests of 
the disputants are all important and all pervading, 
and 
5.2 There are those whose lot in any dispute is that they 
have to suffer. In the instance of this dispute as it 
affects F Manufacturing, such persons happen to be 
supervisory and other associated staff. 
And with such an appreciation the action to be taken is as 
follows: 
Recommendat ions 
1. Management will, with sympathy, understand and 
appreciate the suffering and hurts of the supervisory 
and associated staff, but will insist that supervisors 
be forbidden from using the 35 hour working week 
campaign with its problems as an excuse for failure to 
meet our pre-determined deadlines. 
2. Management to insist that supervisors are to increase 
their efforts and usual motivational activities in order 
to overcome the obstacles and drop in morale generated 
by this campaign. 
3. There be a rigid adherence to procedures, controls and 
policies. 
4. No overt action be taken or statements made that might 
assist shop stewards to further arouse the workforce. 
5. Matters of staff discipline, labour problems etc. to be 
discussed in the first instance with the Manager 
Personnel and Industrial Relations. 
6. Work commence immediately on both short and long term 
plans aimed at reducing the ultimate effect of the 
shorter working week. 
7. Otherwise the 35 hour working week campaign to be 
treated as a non-event. 
APPENDIX A 1 (b) 
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Appendix A 1 (b) 
COMPANY F INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM 
TO:- Directors. 
FROM:- Executive Director. 
SUBJECT:- 35 Hour Week Campaign at F Manufacturing Company. 
DATE:- 10th November, 1980. 
Background 
The Manufacturing Company has been subjected to the metal unions 
35 hour compaign since June, 1980, In fact the campaign has been 
applied in two phases: the first being from June to 26th September 
in which members of both the metal unions and the Storemen and 
Packers absented themselves on strike for 5 hours one week in 
every four with an overtime limitation of 8 hours on the first, 
second and third week and with a complete ban on overtime on the 
strike week. The second phase has been applied since the 29th 
September when the 35 hour campaign was escalated to an 8 hour 
strike every second Monday. Consequently all factory employees 
were absent from work, on strike, on the 29th September, 13th and 
29th October. 
You will recall that I advised in a report dated 4th September of 
the national situation with respect to the 35 hour campaign, of 
circumstances with respect to the Company, and of the consequent 
effect upon Company P. The action I recommended should be taken 
was: 
1. Management will, with sympathy, understand and appreciate the 
suffering and hurts of the supervisory and associated staff, 
but will insist that supervisors be forbidden from using the 
35 hour working week campaign with its problems as an excuse 
for failure to meet our pre-determined deadlines. 
2. Management to insist that supervisors are to increase their 
efforts and usual motivational activities in order to 
overcome the obstacles and drop in morale generated by this 
campaign. 
3. There be a rigid adherence to procedures, controls and 
policies. 
4. No overt action be taken or statements made that might assist 
shop stewards to further arouse the workforce. 
5. Matters of staff discipline, labour problems etc. to be 
discussed in the first instance with the Manager Personnel 
and Industrial Relations. 
6. Work commence immediately on both short and long term plans 
aimed at reducing the ultimate effect of the shorter working 
week. 
7. Otherwise the 35 hour working week campaign to be treated as 
a non-event. 
In the following week at a meeting you convened at Smithfield, 
also attended by the General Manager, Marketing Manager, Assistant 
Marketing Manager and myself, it was determined that: 
(a) We should establish the circumstances of our competitors. 
(b) Attempt to organise the M.T.I.A. into taking specific action 
on behalf of mining equipment manufacturers and/or other 
employers who appeared to be bearing the brunt of the metal 
unions campaign. 
(c) Seek to extend the time on any outstanding contracts or where 
possible consider increasing our prices. 
Action Taken Since September, 1980. 
1. Meetings of Foremen were convened at which they were advised 
to embark on a general tightening up campaign. To assist 
them in this exercise the instruction to all staff (Appendix 
I attached) was placed on all notice boards. ?????? 
2. Following complaints from Foremen as to specific problems 
with some shop stewards the instruction dated 16th October, 
(Appendix II attached) was issued. ????? 
(The above being in accordance with my recommendations of 4th 
September, 1980) 
3. Since the 26th September there has been liaison with our 
major competitors as to their industrial situation. In 
addition the assistance of the M.T.I.A. has been sought and 
on the 10th October we provided them with a list of mining 
equipment manufacturers. Subsequently on the 24th October 
and 4th November meetings of what has now become known as 
"Schedule 1 Employers" were held at the M.T.I.A. 
Over the two meetings it was established that J 
Manufacturing, V Engineering, N. Coy, M. Coy, T Manufacturing 
in Newcastle (up to the 31st October, 1980, and in Wollongong 
since 31st October 1980) and as well as this Company were 
being subjected to the 9 day, 72 hour fortnight campaign. 5 
major companies, whilst still being subjected to the standard 
35 hour campaign indicated at the meeting of 4th November 
that they anticipated the worst. 
4. The M.T.I.A. further advised at the meetings as mentioned 
above: 
(a) That efforts were being made by the national employers 
to stop the national wage case, set down for hearing on 
11th November, 1980 from going ahead (with limited 
prospect of success). 
(b) That at meetings of metal trades union members held on 
the 31st October the standard 35 hour campaign was 
called off (but not the 9 day fortnight campaign). 
(c) That in spite of (b) above those employers still being 
affected by the campaign were industries in Altona, 
Victoria, the Victorian ship building industry, A.C.I. 
Glass, mining equipment and agricultural implement 
manufacturers, industries in Wollongong and some 
industries in Newcastle. 
5. At the M.T.I.A. meeting of 24th October, 1980 the action 
companies affected by the continuing campaign were asked to 
consider taking collectively was: 
(a) To treat a strike day as severing continuity of service 
so that accrued annual leave of employees would be 
forfeited. 
(b) Returning employees to award payments only. 
(c) Standing down employees who are not able to be gainfully 
employed. 
(d) Banning overtime. 
(e) Commencing a publicity campaign directed specifically at 
or on behalf of those industries still affected. 
(f) Notifying the Commission. 
The M.T.I.A. meeting of 4th November, 1980 resolved to notify 
the Commission of a dispute and embark at the same time on an 
extensive publicity campaign aimed at the effects of this 
campaign upon our specific Industry. The publicity campaign 
will be pitched to gain national coverage. 
Appendix A.2 
THE AUSTRALIAN CONCILIATION 
AND ARBITRATION COMMISSION 
MR. COMMISSIONER BENNETT 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
C No 4245 of 1980 
F MANUFACTURING LIMITED and 
OTHERS 
and 
THE AMALGAMATED METAL WORKERS 
AND SHIPWRIGHTS UNION and 
OTHERS 
Notification pursuant to 
section 25 of the act of a 
dispute re 35-hour week. 
AT SYDNEY ON MONDAY, 10 NOVEMBER 1980, at 2.20 p.m, 
Copyright in the Commonwealth Government 
THE COMMISSIONER: Could I have the appearances please? 
MR. A.C. EVANS: If it please, Mr. Commissioner, I appear with ray-
col league MR. E.P. HENNESSY for the Metal Trades Industry 
Association. 
MR. S. MAURICE: I appear for the Amalgamated Metal Workers and 
Shipwrights Union. 
MR. D. MURADA: I appear for the Electrical Trades Union. 
MR. B. COCHRAN: If the commission pleases, for the Australasian 
Society of Engineers. 
MR. W. GRANTHAM: If the commission pleases, I represent the 
Federated Ironworkers Association. 
THE COMMISSIONER: This is a notification by the metal Trades 
Industry Association. Mr. Evans? 
MR. EVANS: Mr. Commissioner, this is a serious dispute, and 
equally it is an unfortunate dispute as I will outline to you in a 
moment. Of course you will be aware from the notification that 
it concerns the claim by the metal trades unions for a 35-hour 
week; that is a general claim, and this has up till now been part 
of our claim. It is a serious dispute because these companies -
or at least some of them - and equally the employees in these 
particular companies are amongst the hardest hit in this very long 
campaign. 
This dispute is centred only in New South Wales, this particular 
dispute. I suppose in the metal trades industry itself there has 
been more bloodshed in this particular sector by the employees and 
by the companies than in any other sector. It is true we have 
fairly significant disputes at Altona - that is in Victoria; we 
have a dispute by metal workers in the glass industry, which is 
significant and has been before this commission, but that is 
Australia wide. 
In relation to the general run of the metal trades factories, 
except perhaps with one possible exception, as I say both sides 
here have taken a real battering, and we are hopeful that as a 
result of these proceedings today that some common sense will 
prevail and we can get back to an even keel, because both the 
companies and the employees have suffered significant financial 
loss. 
It is unfortunate, Mr. Commissioner, I put to you and my 
colleagues from the unions that these companies are involved in 
such a serious dispute, because this is one of the sectors of the 
metal trades industry which can be a growth sector; it does have 
the capacity to employ additional people into the future, because 
as you know they are involved in the resource development area, 
particularly in relation to coal. What has to be realised by the 
unions and by the men on the job more particularly I suggest, is 
that this will not occur, this will not become a growth sector for 
additional employment if, as a result of direct action, or if we 
are forced as a result of direct action, to shorter hours; it will 
increase our costs to such an extent that equipment that these 
companies manufacture can be purchased more cheaply overseas. 
All of us in the metal trades industry, Mr. Commissioner - my 
colleagues from the unions and ourselves - have seen, since the 
mid-70's or earlier, what has happened to employment in this 
industry when goods can be purchased on the world market more 
cheaply than they can be made in Australia, people buy them, and 
jobs go, and we are trying to avoid that. 
The point I want to make for everybody to consider today is that 
the equipment these companies make, that these men help make, is 
all available on the world market and can be - and most likely 
will be - purchased on the world market at world prices if this 
dispute continues. All we have seen happen since 1973-74 onwards 
is that jobs that were formerly performed by Australian metal 
workers are now being performed by metal workers overseas; we are 
not interested in seeing that happen, we want to see the metal 
trades industry grow and prosper and provide more jobs. 
As you will have seen, Mr. Commissioner, from the notification, 
this dispute, along with the rest of the dispute in the metal 
trades industry, has been in existence since May, but generally 
speaking it was escalated in August - earlier than that in one 
particular company - to a nine-day fortnight with restrictions on 
overtime, and particularly numerous bans which are designed to 
impede the production are being faced in a number of companies, 
and they are bans which range from the engagement of new labour, 
bans on the use of sub-contractors, and so on. All of this is 
making it very difficult to produce properly. 
As you would know from your general knowledge mass meetings of 
metal workers throughout Australia in the last week of October 
resolved by 6300 votes to 4300 to suspend the general campaign, 
that is the monthly campaign, so we are left with the situation 
where the general campaign has been suspended and we are faced, 
presumably, with what the ACTU metal trades unions determine as 
their campaign. This had some airing before the commission on 
Wednesday, 22 October, as a result of a notification by the 
national employers, of course of which my association was one. I 
will just hand up to you, Mr. Commissioner, the text of that 
statement by the full bench; I have some here for my colleagues. 
This is just a full text of that statement on Thursday, 23. I 
only wish to refer you to a couple of paragraphs on page 2 and 
this is what the full bench said: 
The ACTU agree that it was 
co-ordinating the shorter 
as a focal point for the 
campaign. 
This is important: 
The ACTU also emphasize that 
in those industries directly 
was proceeding 
without industrial action. 
That is the point I want to make: 
In respect of the metal industries 
co-ordination of 
the campaign. 
As I said, the resolution was carried out and the ACTU is 
presumably taking over this campaign, and if it is, in the ACTU;s 
own words, and I was there to hear it, that the campaign that the 
ACTU is waging is going to do so without industrial disputation 
and the full bench acted on that and declined to act on the 
national employers notification not to proceed with the national 
wage case. So what I am putting to you, you and the people in 
the room, really is, that quite clearly now the great bulk of 
metal workers throughout Australia will go back to normal work 
after a year of disruption. 
The great bulk of companies will be working normally, the great 
bulk of employees will be receiving their normal pay and not 
suffering any financial loss; and what we are trying to achieve as 
a result of this notification, Mr. Commissioner, is that this same 
situation, the general situation, apply in this sector. It is 
not in the interests of this sector, it is not in the interest of 
the employees in it, as far as we are concerned, for them to be 
the battering rams, to fight the campaign on behalf of some 
mysterious body because it is clearly not on behalf of the ACTU. 
We are hopeful that common sense will prevail, that the men will 
go back to normal work, lift all their bans and let the ACTU 
pursue their claim by the normal orderly methods that they 
obviously intend to pursue. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Evans. Perhaps we could hear 
the point of view of some of the trade union advocates. 
MR. MAURICE: Well, Mr. Commissioner, I would agree with Mr. Evans 
that it is a serious dispute. It has been as far as J 
Manufacturing is concerned or the employees at J. Manufacturing 
are concerned - a most serious dispute. 
We have had a long history of disputation with this particular 
company. It has been their wont from time to time when the 
employees of the metal trades unions put in a log of claims for 
that company to say, and finally to agree, that once they have 
paid the claims it flows on to other people within that particular 
establishment and I might say, Mr. Commissioner, that it has been 
a one way street for many years. 
What has upset the employees particularly at J Manufacturing is 
that when they put the reverse claim in indicating that quite a 
substantial number of people in that establishment are working a 
35-hour week and a 37 1/2 hour week, we were told the reverse does 
not apply, and in fact we can go back over a number of years as to 
where this has happened and where the claims have gone in and been 
treated with scorn by the management. So it now heartens me 
somewhat that the metal trades industries association speaking on 
their behalf now are concerned about the blood spilt by the 
employees. That is the first time, I think, that the company 
have indicated their concern. 
We would agree that in fact it is a growth sector. As a matter 
of fact that is another thing that is burning in the minds of our 
members in all of the companies as I understand it, not only J but 
all of the companies that are involved in this particular dispute, 
because again while there are white collar workers and certain 
office workers are enjoying a 35-hour and 37 1/2 hour week, and 
their compatriots that work on the equipment that they make and 
repair get a 35 hour week, they are expected to keep going on a 
40-hour week. 
So there is, as I say, a number of reasons why the campaign has 
been continued in this particular sector. I can assure you that 
the mysterious body that Mr. Evans refers to is that vast crowd of 
faceless employees who from day to day, year to year, front up at 
the gates of the various establishments seeing that other people 
within that employment sector in fact are, as I say, on less than 
40 hours and the people who do most, in our view, to make sure 
that the employers keep reaping in the profits are the people who 
get the short end of the stick. 
Now as far as the companies now using theat, and I take it as a 
threat, of purchasing equipment overseas, well I can assure the 
Metal Trades Industries Association and the employers if that is 
the case and that threat is implemented, well then there are other 
methods and means within the trade union movement to make sure 
that when that equipment is bought and paid for, that it does not 
get off the ship and we will be using every effort that we can 
bring forward to make sure that that particular equipment stays 
there and will finish up like the Flying Dutchman, it will be 
going round and round the world and will not be able to find a 
home. 
Now as far as the ACTU is concerned, I appreciate the fact that 
Mr. Evans of course deals fairly extensively with this part of the 
trade union movement and I appreciate the fact that from time to 
time when in the job that he is in, he has got to stretch his 
imagination a little bit to make sure that the people he 
represents get a better deal and from what I understand the 
position to be from within the trade union movement that the 35 
hour week campaign is not suspended; that in fact the efforts in 
fact are being redirected and there are quite a number of industry 
sectors that have been selected by the ACTU and the trade union 
movement generlly to look at this 35-hour campaign and there has 
been a number of meetings, as I understand it in all the various 
shops that the employers are represented here today where they 
have said in line with the sentiments that I have expressed that 
they are prepared to be involved in this sector campaign that is 
now being initiated. 
So as has already been indicated, the growth industry is there and 
it is exactly what we were talking about, about the 35-hour week 
because unless employees receive some benefit of the technology 
that they are now applying, well then I would suggest that if they 
stayed on the 40-hour week, well then the jobs that are there now 
will be quite less than what they would have been had they gone to 
the 35-hour week because Mr. Evans of course would not tell you, 
but I think it is pretty plain knowledge that employers have set 
up a company in the ACT to advise all of the employers about the 
technology that is available around the world. As far as we are 
concerned they are not backward in coming forward to avail 
themselves of all the advice that is there for them to get. 
So whether we put on a campaign for a 35-hour week or not, 
employers, as they have done in the past, have of course availed 
themselves of the technology that is available elsewhere and they 
will implement it as soon as is possible to put as much money in 
their pockets as they possibly can. 
It stuns me, as a matter of fact - and I take a bit of stunning -
that the employers at J Manufacturing are complaining about some 
bans that have been put on in respect of the 35-hour week. 
I have always suspected that the communication gap at J. 
Manufacturing has been fairly wide, but I did not know that it was 
as wide as the Sydney Harbour heads, because I have got a list of 
half a dozen bans that are allegedly in support of the 35-hour 
week campaign, and it is not the fact at all. In fact, I cannot 
understand what on earth we are doing here because part of this 
notice to the employees says: 
We ask in return that all direct issues of the campaign be 
maintained, for example the 9-day fortnight. 
They agree with it. 
However, all bans unique to this site are lifted immediately 
There were a number of bans there, a half a dozen bans, that have 
got nothing to do with the 35-hour week at all. There is a 
problem about car parking, there is a problem about casual labour, 
there is a problem about obsolete machinery, there is a problem 
about people using one-ton trucks as expediters, there is a 
question of some logos in the inspection department, there is a 
problem about - whatever this means - normal management/union 
delegate discussions will be resumed in accordance with a laid 
down disputes procedure to be issued. 
As far as I am aware, while the delegates and the management might 
not be able to agree, it has been my experience, Mr. Commissioner, 
that the talks go on at J Manufacturing interminably; in fact, I 
would suggest they probably have more discussions between 
themselves, the delegates and the management, than three other 
places that I could think of put together. As I said, I just 
cannot understand what all that is about. 
In respect of the normal car parking arrangements, from what I can 
understand the white collar workers are pinching some of the spots 
that the local blokes, the tradesmen and trades assistants, 
occupy, and that has been a blue that has been going on for some 
time, because it is a dispute about availability of parking that 
has been in existence for some time and in that particular area. 
As a matter of fact their big brother across the road, Qantas, 
that is a dispute that is going on there, and has been going on 
for some time, because of the area that they are involved in, 
where they have got their establishment. 
In respect of their casual labour, there are a number of disputes 
that have taken place over that in the past, and I think it will 
continue to be so because of the way the company - the type of 
people the company want, they want what is normally referred to in 
the trade as body hire. Of course, we have got objections about 
that, and that is a separate dispute on its own. 
As far as the obsolete machinery to be allowed to be replaced is 
concerned, that relates to a problem that the company is intending 
to move their premises. We have been trying to corner the company 
into a position where they are prepared to discuss the future of 
the workers at J Manufacturing in Botany. They have told us a 
number of things from time, to time, that they are looking at 
sites here, there and everywhere, trying to do deals with Qantas 
and a couple of other places, and so what the lads are saying on 
the job - and I believe quite rightly - that from their point of 
view, you are not going to move any machinery out of this plant 
until we know what our future is going to be. I think that is a 
fair enough assessment of the situation. 
In respect of the other point that I made about an expediter 
vehicle, they had a small panel van at one time, these expediters; 
now they have got a one-ton truck. I do now know what they are 
supposed to do with a one-ton truck as an expediter; I do not 
think they would get one of those coal mining machines into the 
back of it, but apparently they must be going to try to get some 
parts, and all we are saying in that dispute is that if they are 
going to start carrying things around in a one-ton truck, well the 
people that are driving them ought to be members of the union. At 
this stage I believe they employ a storeman-driver, but we are not 
arguing who the people belong to, whether it is the storemen or 
the transport workers union or whatever, as long as they join the 
union they have not got a dispute. 
The question of logos in the inspection department, I understand 
that is a process whereby using chemicals the company burn in 
their logo on to parts of machinery. There again that is a safety 
issue; that has been in question for quite some time and it has 
been black-banned. As I said I just cannot understand what on 
earth we are doing here because, as I say, we have got a position 
whereby, as far as the company is concerned, they say they respect 
the campaign for a 35-hour week and do not intend to indulge in 
provocative action. That was issued on 7 November, and here we are 
on 10 November sitting around the court explaining our actions. If 
you do not call that provocative, I do not know what was. 
As far as we are concerned, we are prepared on a local basis - and 
always have been - to sit around with the company and talk about 
the problems on the job, and suggest within reason what can be 
done to resolve those local problems; but in respect of the 
35-hour week campaign, of course, as I say that decision had been 
made. I do not see it being unmade unless, of course, all of the 
companies are prepared to sit around and discuss how we are going 
to implement the 35-hour week for all of the employees in the 
industry and not just part of them. So that is the position as 
we see it, Mr. Commissioner. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Maurice, you have been most 
helpful. I think it is common ground both on the side of the 
employers and on the union side from the points that you have 
expressed, that there are some types of bans and limitations on at 
the moment. Would that be true? 
MR. MAURICE: Yes, Mr. Commissioner, but it has got nothing to do 
with the 35-hour week at all. 
THE COMMISSIONER: I am glad that you have cleared that up, 
because in the notification that was received by the registry it 
states: 
The aforementioned employees are engaging in a campaign of 
direct industrial action against the abovenamed employers in 
the mining equipment industry sector of the metal trades 
industry in support of a claim for a 35-hour week. From 
what you are saying, Mr. Maurice, the bans and limitations 
are not in regard to a shorter working week, or shorter 
hours, but to car parking, obsolete equipment or machinery, 
an expediter vehicle, logos in the inspection department and 
other issues; is that correct? 
MR. MAURICE: That is at J Manufacturing at Moscot; I do not know 
what bans are on in other areas. There is quite a number of 
companies which I do not normally visit in any case. As I said, I 
only found out about this this morning around about 11 o'clock 
and, as I understood a phone call that I got, it was only going to 
be in respect of the J Manufacturing Company in any case, and it 
surprised me to see the rest of the coal industry engineering 
companies here. 
THE COMMISSIONER: As far as your organisation is concerned, Mr. 
Maurice, in J Manufacturing Company the campaign for shorter hours 
is not being implemented here but, I think in your own words, is 
being redirected by the ACTU in other places? 
MR. MAURICE: As far as the engineering sector in the coal mining 
industry is concerned, there has been a meeting in quite a number 
of companies - I think in all the ones that are mentioned on the 
notification - and as far as those people are concerned they see 
themselves as a group of workers directly allied to the coal 
industry engineering sector and not to the general metal trades. 
So their campaign in fact has been on the basis of workers 
involved within that industry and whilst they were originally 
involved in the metal industry campaign, they are now compaigning 
on the basis of an industry sector in the coal industry. 
THE COMMISSIONER: In other words you are saying that part of the 
problem then is shorter hours? 
MR. MAURICE: That is right. 
THE COMMISSIONER: And not only car parking, obsolete machinery. 
MR. MAURICE: I agree, as a matter of fact, I point out that the 
company respects the campaign for the 35-hour week and does not 
intend to take provocative action. They say also: 
We ask in return that all direct issues of the campaign be 
maintained, for example the 9-day fortnight. 
They are saying that it should be kept going; I did not write the 
letter, the company did - it is signed by Mr. J.W. Burns, Managing 
Director. As I said, I just cannot understand what the hell we 
are doing here. 
MR. EVANS: Mr. Commissioner, I wanted to remain silent as long as 
I could. That is one plant of J Manufacturing, there is the 
other one at Kurri, and then there are all the other companies 
that my good friend Mr. Maurice is just flossing over. I took it 
with a broad brush without going into it; there is a 9-day 
fortnight in operation at all these companies, that is in 
existance for a 35-hour week. There are overtime restrictions in 
existence at all these companies in direct support of a 35-hour 
week, and additionally there is a variety of bans which vary from 
plant to plant. Some of them Mr. Maurice might be quite right 
about, they have got a background going back; others are directly 
related to the 35-hour week campaign. There is no dispute 
between us. 
Mr. Maurice is trying to say that there is a special part there; 
as far as we are concerned they are part and parcel of the metal 
trades, they have hived off presumably thinking they are acting in 
accordance with ACTU policy; we say they are not. 
They are acting outside it, and their campaign of direct action is 
outside the ACTU policy and should be called off. 
THE COMMISSIONER: From where I sit, Mr. Evans, I am aware of ACTU 
policy and certain decisions that we made by rank and file in 
regard to the shorter hours campaign. 
I am also aware - and I am quite sure that everyone present in the 
commission today is aware - that the matter of shorter hours is 
one that must be dealt with in another place in another manner, 
and if any part of the claim is aimed at shorter hours then 
obviously the correct procedure by the union or unions concerned 
is to make application in the proper manner so that it will be 
dealt with by the authority which is competent in accordance with 
the act to deal with it. 
Now, as far as the commission as presently constituted is 
concerned, I most certainly would do everything that I can to 
assist the parties in resolving problems such as car parking, 
obsolete machinery and so on if, in fact, those disputes exist but 
as far as the shorter working hours is concerned I am stressing 
that the appropriate way of handling that, and I am speaking to 
the unions now, is to make the appropriate application. 
Now, if we have these other problems on the one hand that the 
union or unions design to have resolved then let us look at that 
as a problem but at the moment I am trying to find out to what 
extent the company's notification in regard to shorter working 
hours is being pressed by the unions and perhaps we can see where 
we can go on the matter of shorter hours in that area if that is 
where the problem is. Perhaps we could hear from some of the 
other unions. 
MR. MURADA: Thank you Commissioner; I might be able to enlighten 
you on three of those areas, as a matter of fact, I am personally 
associated with. One is V, M and T's and there is certainly a 
campaign there, yes. These people for some time - as a matter of 
fact it has been 30 years since the 40-odd hours working week was 
brought in to Australia wide. 
Productivity compared to output per worker is virtually double. 
Employees naturally enough have not received the same benefits as 
their employers and particularly the companies as here, they are 
repair and manufacturing industries, and there is no doubt they 
have not got to look too far to see other people in virtually the 
same industry or certainly in the coal raining industry in relation 
to a 35-hour week. Those people have enjoyed a 35-hour week for 
a number of years. And the particular people involved have met. 
They have met on several occasions, not just on one occasion. 
They have changed their tactics since late as last week. I can 
assure you I was at T's in Port Kembla and they - in what Mr. 
Evans said it is not 100 per cent true because it is not due to 
start till next week although the intentions may be there. But 
nevertheless the fortnight - or the nine-day fortnight - is 
supposed to commence as of next week and they certainly - I think 
that out of something like 100 people, I better reduce that 
figure, something like 60 people voted and there was three against 
it so I might add it was almost a unanimous decision that a 
nine-day fortnight be in fact worked and unless those people lift 
those requests I am afraid - it was by their own decision they 
made that. The same as at M, the same at V Engineering. I 
believe J is about to move into that area but I am not too sure 
about that personally. Once again, Commissioner, as far as I am 
concerned these people have their own people in the coal raining 
industry enjoying a 35 hour, in fact, receiving a 35 hour and they 
certainly do not want to be the only people in that area that - on 
that basis of over the mountain as we call it and down at Port 
Kembla they do intend to pursue the policy. 
It would appear that the ACTU is going to come into it as has been 
indicated here. They will be - as a matter of fact it has been 
laid to one particular union that the present campaign be 
organised by that union and in relation to all other unions in 
those sectors and they are receiving full co-operation. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Murada. It would appear to me 
just as there was a reduction of working hours from 48 to 44 hours 
some years ago and in more recent times from 44 to 40, then I 
would think it inevitable that hours will be shortened in some way 
at some time in the future on a standard basis. As to whether it 
will be a 35 hour week or a nine day fortnight or something else I 
do not know and as I indicated earlier it will not be this type of 
hearing that is going to give it, 
I do not know whether the members of your union employed in these 
companies imagine that the company is going to hand it on a plate 
to them outside the commission or not, but again, I would say to 
you that the appropriate way to handle this matter is for an 
application to be made for variation of the award and when you 
mention the fact that productivity has increased well there is one 
argument among many, no doubt, that you would be aware of that you 
could use in such an application, particularly in view of the 
introduction of new technology; but as far as the commission as 
presently constituted is concerned, as I have said before, I am 
not in the position to be able to assist the unions there. 
Do I take it that that is the only issue in these places that you 
are covering is shorter working hours and not other matters such 
as car parking etcetera? 
MR. MURADA: To my knowledge that is the present campaign, Mr. 
Commissioner. 
MR. COCHRAN: Mr. Commissioner, Mr. Evans has stated that people 
in the mine manufacturing are part of the general metal industry 
award sector, but the people in the mining manufacture midway 
through the general campaign saw that they were different, they 
had seen the line the glass industry was taking whereby disputes, 
by stoppages, the people in the glass industry could get the 
employees around a table to talk, then to come to the commission 
to seek their help in setting up joint working parties so that 
they could consult on how to attain a shorter working week within 
that industry. 
Now, the people in the mining manufacturing could see that they 
were something special, the general standard within that type of 
industry was for a shorter working week, whether it be 35 - but it 
was less than 40, so they decided to call all the employees within 
that area to meetings to break away from the general metal trades 
campaign as it was and to up their campaign to try and get the 
employees around the table. 
I agree with what my colleagues say that the unions are always 
prepared to sit around the table and talk because I think that a 
lot of good can come out of talking, by conciliation rather than 
by arbitration. You only have to look at how the glass industry 
has come a long way down the line to where they have Commissioner 
Vosti helping and they have now come to a stage where they are 
going to have inspections I believe within that industry, and that 
is why the people in the mining manufacturing have upped their 
campaign to try to get the people to sit down and talk. They 
believe that they are different from the general metal trades and 
that is why they have upped their campaign but they still believe 
they are apart from the general campaign. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Cochran, again I refer to the notification 
by the Metal Trades Industry Association in which we are now 
notified that the claim for a 35 hour week has been rejected by 
the employers. I do not know the history of that rejection, but 
perhaps I could ask Mr. Evans: Is there a reluctance by the 
employers to get around the table to discuss this matter, to do 
something similar to what may have been originally done in the 
glass industry? 
MR. EVANS: As we said in the glass industry, we are prepared to 
talk to anybody at any time, the fact is we are not talking at the 
moment in the glass industry because the employees considered they 
would continue with a campaign of direct action and we said, good, 
we can have as much direct action as you like but you will not get 
any talks. 
So, ray friend is wrong about the glass industry, it has now 
reached a stalemate after 7 months of fairly massive direct action 
and loss from both sides so there are no talks at all in the glass 
industry. 
Our position here is we will talk until we are blue in the face 
but it will be talking to convince them to drop their claim. 
There is no way in the world - we do not mind doing that, we can 
convince them, we have all the arguments in the world - there is 
no way in the world we are going to sit around a table and concede 
reduced hours. 
These discussions have taken place with individual companies over 
the period and it is partly the industry and it is partly the 
association. The members who are here today, their view has been 
put nationally that this matter can be resolved in a normal 
orderly way by the metal trades unions or the ACTU seeking to file 
a general application for hours or as you quite rightly suggest, 
Mr. Commissioner, they could file an application for hours in this 
industry. There are more than six companies, they are the ones 
who are principally concerned today, but we would welcome any 
case which we would argue in the proper place about reduced hours 
and all we are trying to do is say that is one way of doing it, 
that is a sensible way to do it, it is not sensible for these 
blokes to be virtually the only shock troops in Australia. 
THE COMMISSIONER: it seems to me, Mr. Evans, there are three main 
ways of doing it; one is to go along with ACTU policies and 
activity, the other is seek a variation of this award and the 
other way is to do what they are doing at the moment. Now, 
frankly I cannot see that the current method is being successful 
nor is it likely to be successful, particularly as you have been 
quite frank in answering the question that I posed and that is 
were you prepared to talk and you said yes, you were prepared to 
talk but you were going to tell them that you were not going to 
give. 
Well I do not think that is what they are looking for. I have 
had a bit of experience in trade union matters. I would like to 
see the parties get together if for no other purpose than to work 
out a programme to allow the unions to make the proper application 
to the commission for a variation of the award. That is what I 
would like to see; but that is entirely up to the unions who at 
this moment appear to be looking at one of the alternatives. 
Perhaps I might ask Mr. Grantham would he like to add anything. 
MR. GRANTHAM: Yes, Commissioner, I think Mr. Evans should realise 
that the ACTU clearly identifies the mining equipment as a 
separate entity as distinct from the general metal trades spectrum 
of industry which is pretty broad across Australia. Now, the 
ACTU condones the campaign and the campaign the boys are doing out 
there at J is virtually in line with the ACTU policy and to go 
outside the ACTU policy would be to virtually try and take the 
campaign out of their hands when unionists throughout Australia 
are lining up behind the ACTU's campaign for the shorter working 
week. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Perhaps you might tell us exactly what is the 
ACTU policy? 
MR. GRANTHAM: It is a 70 hour 9 day fortnight. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, but what is the method that the ACTU 
proposes to adopt to achieve their purpose. 
MR. GRANTHAM: Action on the shop floor in selected industries. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Is this one of the selected industries? 
MR. GRANTHAM: Yes it is, it comes in group 3 of the ACTU policy. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Does the company agree with that? 
MR. EVANS: All I am saying is somebody had the full bench on. I 
was there when the ACTU advocate said these words that I read to 
you. The ACTU emphasised that in those industries directly 
co-ordinated by it the claim for a shorter working week was 
proceeding without industrial action. Now, if the ACTU does not 
mean what it says I suppose it is a matter for another place. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Are you sure of your facts, Mr. Grantham? 
MR. GRANTHAM: I have a circular here that says it is part of a 
list of 32 industries, the ACTU, divided into three groups. 
MR. COCHRAN: May I say something, commissioner? 
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. 
MR. COCHRAN: What Mr. Evans said the ACTU delegate to the full 
bench said is probably right, but I will repeat that the mining 
manufacturer broke away from the general metal trades industry 35 
hour a week campaign about half way through it. Now they have 
decided they are separate, that they are an area that can break 
through. I believe that they were not involved in the stoppages 
last week because they have decided the action they will take. 
THE COMMISSIONER: We are at cross purposes, Mr. Cochran. What I 
am trying to find out is whether the ACTU imagines that this 
industry is one of the selected industries that the ACTU is 
involved with. 
MR. COCHRAN: Well, none of the areas as under the general metal 
trades campaign have been called together as yet. That is up to 
the unions to co-ordinate those meetings. As I said the mining 
manufacture had started before the ACTU was called in to 
co-ordinate the campaign. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The ACTU has not called the relevant industries 
together? 
MR. COCHRAN: No. 
THE COMMISSIONER: But is this particular industry on the list to 
your knowledge? 
MR. COCHRAN: Yes, they are on the list but they have not been 
called together under the auspices of the ACTU 
THE COMMISSIONER: But they will be called together? 
MR. COCHRAN: I believe they will commissioner. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Are these industries and the unions concerned 
going to be involved in the ACTU campaign in these selected areas? 
MR. COCHRAN: It is a strange fact of life, Mr. Commissioner, that 
you can go to people and say that they should become involved in a 
certain campaign and then you try and talk until you are blue in 
the face and those people will decide that they will, you know, do 
the opposite of what you put up. Mr. Evans said why should this 
group of employers bear the brunt of the campaign when all the 
others have pulled out. There are a number of shops that are 
still pursuing the 35 hour week or a shorter working week. 
THE COMMISSIONER: But, Mr. Cochran, you cannot have it both ways. 
Either you are part of the ACTU campaign which I think Mr. 
Grantham was saying you are, or, on the other hand, run your own 
race. 
MR. COCHRAN: They have not been called together under the 
auspices of the ACTU as yet, Mr. Commissioner. Once they get 
there they can tell the ACTU where to go. A lot of our people 
tell us where to go, too; any union official has not had a perfect 
record of being able to convince these people that they should do 
certain action. 
MR. MAURICE: Mr. Commissioner, the position should be quite 
obviously plain, that as Mr. Evans had indicated this is a new 
South Wales dispute. It is not an interstate dispute in which the 
ACTU in fact can intervene. Now, if it becomes interstate then I 
have no doubt that the ACTU will probably call the unions 
together. At this stage it is companies which are mostly J 
Manufacturing, they own J. Manufacturing, they also own the place 
up at Kurri Kurri and I understand will own V Engineering very 
shortly. The majority of it is one company, it has spread from 
the company, there is a number of other people involved in the 
like industries that have got themselves involved into the 
campaign. 
As I said it is a New South Wales dispute, it has been 
orchestrated, if you like, by that mysterious body that I referred 
to before that Mr. Evans did not seem to know anything about, 
those blokes in the blue overalls who said that they want the 35 
hour week the same as everybody else who works in the industry 
whether they work on the machines in the pits or whether they work 
on the machines up on top of the pits or whether they work in the 
offices of those companies they are employed with; they want an 
equal go like everybody else. I can understand the problem of 
trying to sort all this out, J. Manufacturing management has a bit 
of trouble organising just to get together with the 45 unions in 
the place to talk about ordinary problems which they cannot solve 
and which I have read out so I have no doubt why there is some 
confusion. If they try to organise all of the rest of the 
companies together to talk about or not to talk about a 35 hour 
week, I can understand we are in the confused situation. 
The plain fact of the matter is that the employees over many, many 
months have decided initially they would be in the metal industry 
campaign; they then decide as has already been indicated that 
because of the unfairness of the situation - the office workers 
and the rest of the blue collar workers in the industry are on a 
35 hour week, some on 35 some on less than 40, they should be part 
of it too and they have banded together to argue on a combined 
basis. 
Now, that is not an unusual thing to do, in fact, we wish it would 
happen more often and it is a rank and file campaign and has been 
indicating it is rolling fairly successfully otherwise the 
employers would not be down here crying tears of blood. So, to 
say that it is not successful I think is a bit of MOr. Evans' 
double talk that he uses from time to time when you have him on 
the ropes and gasping he says he is not feeling the punch. 
So, as far as we are concerned, that is the position, Mr. 
Commissioner, as far as those half a dozen points that I read out 
are concerned, we have indicated to management we are prepared to 
sit down around the table and talk to you about it, I cannot 
understand what it has to do with all the rest of the people ---
MR. EVANS: They have all got strikes. 
MR. MAURICE: If that is the basis of the argument for a 35 hour 
week - half a dozen points that have been outlined to us to all 
employees of J and I read things as I see them, it says: 
J. Manufacturing - to all employees 
I took that to cover the people at V Engineering and the people up 
in Kurri Kurri, if that is not the case then obviously that is a 
local matter which we will fix up, but if it is a position of 
sitting down and trying to convince us that we ought to call off 
the 35 hour campaign well then, as far as I am concerned, I have 
got plenty of work to do other than stand around spruiking here 
all day. I am prepared to drop right off now because I am not 
going to sit around the table to have some people who in their own 
employ have people working on a 35 hour week. The Metal Trades 
Industry Association will understand all of their employees work a 
35 hour week - for them to sit around and tell us we have to pull 
the campaign off - as far as I am concerned that is not on and if 
the conference is just to do that then as I said, as far as I am 
concerned I am wasting my time and everybody else's. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Can anyone see the advantage of going into 
private conference with the advocates? 
MR. EVANS: While Mr. Maurice is thinking about it, I know he lives 
near J but I wish he would get it out of his mind, he is not just 
talking about J, he is talking about all these companies and all 
the employees. As I said before, we are happy to go into 
conference but the purpose of our talk in conference will be to 
persuade them to get back to normal. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Let me put it another way Mr. Evans: this was a 
notification by your association. What is it that you are asking 
the commission to do. 
MR. EVANS: I think what you said, Mr. Commissioner, to recommend 
to them and you have said it, if they think they have a genuine 
claim that they should file an application to vary the award and 
conduct it in the normal way the system provides and while that is 
being conducted, to call off direct action. 
THE COMMISSIONER: You would appreciate that I can do little more 
than that. 
MR. EVANS: That is all, but if you would recommend that we think 
that the men would take notice of what you put. 
THE COMMISSIONER: I so recommend. 
MR. MAURICE: Before you do, Mr. Commissioner, I am getting a bit 
confused now, because I have a letter here that says: 
The company respect the campaign 
for the 35 hour week 
for example the 9 day fortnight. 
Now, here we have the Metal Trades Industries Association saying 
that for all of this the employers to call it off, asking you to 
call it off. I have a letter signed by the managing director of 
three of the four companies involved saying 
MR. EVANS: No, signed by one, J. Manufacturing. 
MR. MAURICE: Who owns V Engineer and Kurri Kurri ---
MR. EVANS: It does not. 
MR. MAURICE: --- it is all the same company. 
THE COMMISSIONER: You have got me confused now. 
MR. MAURICE: He has got me very confused. He is asking for the 
Metal Trades Industries Association - he is asking for a 
recommendation to call off the campaign. Now, as I said, in 
three of the establishments that are involved in it, we have got a 
letter to say the campaign should go on signed by the managing 
director. Can I ask now, is the recommendation only going to be 
to those companies other than J Manufacturing or those 
subsidiaries that they represent. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Could you read out the relevant portion of that 
letter to me? 
MR. MAURICE: I will hand a copy up. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Evans, can you help me with clause 6 and 
tell me what it means. 
MR. EVANS: I would say this is just a use of English - you could 
put it another way Yes, the managing director here is 
confronted with a situation where none of these bans were on, 
Laurie Carmichael turned up at my friend's request. 
He address es a. ineeting and suddently we get all the bans on so we 
have got that. The second situation Is, in the middle of a 
campaign the managing director of this company, Mr. Burns, is 
realistic enough to think that these blokes at J will not call it 
off unilaterally so he has gone out and spoken to them all and 
said, "l am prepared to make certain concessions to get us back to 
normal" - because it is not a normal situation at J it is 
absolutely abnormal and I think they lead the race in this 
particular environment and I think it would be reasonable to say 
they have more trouble than any of the other companies. 
The Managing Director of this particular company says, look, I 
will bend a bit to see if you can get back to normal like all the 
other companies. It is bad enough to be like all the other 
companies, it is worse to be out on our own 
THE COMMISSIONER: Meaning a 9 day fortnight? 
MR. EVANS: Meaning to get all the other bans off and while there 
is a 9 day fortnight on all the other companies he was realistic 
enough to know that the blokes at J will not pull it off on their 
own. 
THE COMMISSIONER: That answers the question for me. 
MR. EVANS: That is all he said. Now, if we get them all off, if 
Company blokes pull it off we want the J Blokes to pull it off as 
well. That is all he had said, he spoke to the blokes himself, 
he said, look I am right here to ask you blokes unilaterally to 
dump your mates, I know if it is going to go on you will be in it. 
THE COMMISSIONER: It appears to me that what he is saying, is 
lift all the other bans but leave the 9 day fortnight ban there. 
MR. EVANS: Only because he is realistic enough to know that the 
blokes will not lift upon their own. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Realistic or not, that is what he has done. 
MR. EVANS: That is all. 
THE COMMISSIONER: And the question has now been put, where do 
they stand in the light of 
MR. EVANS: He wants it off, he would like it off, but he realises 
he would not get it off on his own and he has not gone out to the 
blokes and said, I will try and buy you out, one out. 
THE COMMISSIONER: He is only speaking of one company is not he? 
MR. EVANS: He is speaking of J Manufacturing Company who have a 
plant here at Mascot which my friend is pre-occupied with and 
Kurri and they are both very troublesome. 
MR. MAURICE: And V Engineering. 
MR. EVANS: He does not own V Engineering. 
MR. MAURICE: He will in November. 
MR. EVANS: He might, he does not own it, it is a separate legal 
entity and they are represented here today, so this is the manager 
of one company taking a very practical approach with hard nosed 
blokes and he has not stood up and said I want you to call it off; 
he simply said get back and only be as bad as all the others are. 
MR. MAURICE: Well, we will do that. 
MR. EVANS: Get all the bans off is a start. 
MR. GRANTHAM: May I speak, Mr. Commissioner? 
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Grantham. 
MR. GRANTHAM: This is the ACTU policy in this, I will list group 
3 . 
It is that group which the metal 
industry campaign committee .... 
ship building 
and there are a couple of other industries there. It has been 
broken into three sections which says: 
the first section were those 
industries 
and agricultural implement industry. 
So, the policy is in line 
THE COMMISSIONER: Whose circular is that? 
THE COMMISSIONER: I do not want to see it, it is from your union. 
MR. GRANTHAM: Yes, it is a copy of what the ACTU is. 
THE COMMISSIONER: As I see it, there seems to be little that I 
can do today. I would repeat my earlier statement that the 
proper way for the matter of shorter hours to be attended to by 
the trade unions is to make appropriate application to the 
commission for a variation of the award, or alternatively to fall 
in with whatever the ACTU decides, which may well be some kind of 
a test case. 
In addition to that I believe it would be to the advantage of all 
the parties if some kind of a conference were arranged between the 
appropriate organisations for the purpose of discussing this 
matter at least, so that something may emerge as to the future 
development of the issue and hopefully the resolution of the bans 
and limitations. 
Apart from that there is very little we can do today and the 
commission now stands adjourned 
AT 3.21 P.M. THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED - INDEFINITELY 
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25th February, 1981 
F MANUFACTURING COMPANY DISPUTE AS NOTIFIED 
TO THE CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION COMMISSION 
ON 23RD FEBRUARY, 1981. 
BACKGROUND SUMMARISED 
I consider that the best overall view of this dispute can be 
achieved by dividing events which commenced in April, 1980 to 
today, into four parts, viz.: 
1. May to 29th September, 1980. 
2. 30th September, 1980 to 31st October, 1980. 
3. 1st November, 1980 to 31st December, 1980. 
4. 1st January, 1981 to Current Date. 
A limited build up campaign had been in operation for a 
considerable period prior to April 1980 in the form of walk outs 
and go slow tactics as part of "a softening up process." 
BACKGROUND EXPANDED 
The actions/counteractions which have occurred in each of the 
above periods can be viewed from an Employer or Unionist aspect. 
Attached hereto for each of the periods as set out above with 
supporting documentation as an appendicy are listings of key 
events which have occurred. 
THE ISSUES 
In a dispute as protracted as this matter has been, it is often 
difficult in retrospect to clearly define what ultimately is an 
issue but in my view, the issues are as follows: 
1- Union Activities at F Manufacturing Company 
Since May, members of the A.M.W.S.U., F.I.A., A.S.E. and in 
some instances, Storemen and Packers and Electrical Trades 
Union have engaged in activities contrary to the Metal 
Industry Award as part of a campaign for a 35 hour week. 
The overall reason for engaging in these activities seems no 
longer to be important but rather the extent of and type of 
activity being engaged in (examples of which are listed 
hereunder) and their effect upon the Company's operations are 
important. 
Examples of the limitations mentioned above are: 
9 day fortnight (36 hour week). 
Complete ban on overtime. 
Complete ban on the subcontracting of work. 
Complete ban on the despatch of finished goods. 
A ban on the employment of new labour. 
A ban on the filling out of time tickets. 
A work to rule within classification limitation. 
A ban on the introduction of shift work in the Fitting 
Shop. 
2. Company's Response to the Bans and Limitations Imposed 
Throughout this dispute the Company has maintained that the 
correct approach from the Unions for gaining of reduced hours 
should be by application for a variation of the appropriate 
award or through an A.C.T.U. promoted test case. 
The Company in taking a stand supportive of the system has 
attempted to maintain production in spite of the Trade Union 
activities. 
The Company now claims that it should be allowed to produce 
its goods and services without Union inspired hindrance. 
Initially the Company reacted to the Union imposed 
limitations by attempting to re-organise its production by 
increasing labour capacity through introduction of additional 
shifts and/or to meet commitments to customers by maintenance 
of a practice introduced late in 1979 of subcontracting 
orders which had become time critical. 
As the Unions' campaign intensified subsequently the Company 
took the following actions: 
a. As part of the Mining Equipment Manufacturers, the 
Company approached the Arbitration Commission for 
assistance. 
b. The Company wrote letters to employees in an attempt to 
set down the damaging effects to the Company of the 
method being adopted by the Unions. 
c. The Company attempted to overcome specific bans and 
limitations but was forced into a "no work - no pay" 
situation by the Unionists. 
d. Section 25 (e) of the Metal Industry Award was applied 
with respect to the strike of the 8th December, 1980. 
e. Employees have been stood down once they could not be 
usefully employed. 
f. The Company;s losses in 1980 were $3,900,000 and best 
estimate, approximately $1,000,000 can be attributed to 
this dispute. 
RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE 
The Company seeks a return to good industrial relations which it 
considers can only be achieved by: 
1. The lifting of all bans and limitations by Unions. 
2. That a Company re-structuring made necessary as a result of 
this dispute take place smoothly even though the Company will 
have to terminate a number of employees to achieve both a 
trading back to profitability and guaranteed job security for 
the remaining workforce. 
3. Negotiation to commence about specific conditions of 
employment consistent with the Company's re-structuring. 
4. The establishment of proper relations between Management and 
Union Officials. 
To achieve the above, the Company with reluctance is prepared to 
reserve its decision with respect to the application of Section 
25(e) of the Metal Industry Award and is of course prepared to 
withdraw the stand down notices to allow a resumption of work. 
APPENDIX A.4 
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19th February, 1981. 
Dear Sir, 
F Manufacturing Company, as a major supplier of equipment to the 
mining and allied industries has been subjected, since May, 1980, 
to the metal Unions' campaign for a reduced working week. This 
campaign has been intensified since October to include not only 
one day stoppages every fortnight, but also rolling strikes, 
overtime bans, bans on sub-contracting of work, bans on shift 
work, bans on employment and work to rule limitations. 
We have been informed that J Manufacturing Company, for reasons 
best known to themselves have offered to their employees a 36 1/2 
hour week from 1st March, 1981 with a phasing in of a 35 hour week 
by 1st March 1982. This action has been taken in spite of the 
Federal Government's expressed concern on the 35 hour issue and 
the M.T.I.A.'s application to bring the issue before a Full Bench 
of the Arbitration Commission. Naturally F is concerned at the 
potential on-going effect of arrangements made outside the 
Arbitration Commission on Australian manufacturing companies and 
on industries which they service. 
The F Manufacturing Company, over the past 15 years, has played a 
major part in the development and local manufacture of equipment 
for the Australian mining industry. Such equipment includes: 
Mine Rovers 
Universal Transporters 
Diesel Powered Underground equipment. 
Underground and Mineral Exploration Drills 
Mine Ventilation Fans 
Hoists and Winders. 
Personnel Transport Cars. 
Flat Top Transporters. 
Ore Trucks 
Stone Dusting Equipment 
Feeder Breakers 
Roof Bolting and Timbering Equipment. 
Aircraft Towing Tractors. 
Conveyors. 
In addition, the Company has expended large sums on the 
modification of products originally developed overseas, e.g. the 
Continuous Miner, in order to make such products compatible with 
Australian mining requirements. 
Unfortunately, the losses suffered and the on-going costs arising 
out of this campaign by the Unions have forced us to review the 
basis of our operations. This will mean a rationalisation of our 
product range and a minimising of our role in research and 
development of mining equipment products. Further, we shall be 
limiting our participation as principal contractor in major 
Australasian materials handling projects and inevitably in the 
export market. 
We will be in contact with you in the near future regarding the 
implications of the above on our future operations and the impact 
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PROGRESS REPORT ON MAJOR EXPORT PROJECT 
ILLUSTRATING EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL UNREST 
PERIOD 1976 - 81 
INVITATION TO TENDER 
New Zealand Electricity Commission issued invitations to tenderers 
for the supply and construction of a coal handling plant 
associated with a major power generation plant. The tenderers 
were asked to return submissions for December 1974 with full 
details of the basis of design proposed including NZ content and 
overseas content. The enquiry called for a fixed price contract 
subject only to C.P.I, and Industrial Award increases for the 
period of the contract. It was envisaged that the contract 
period would be some two years from the date of awarding the 
contract subject only to a design approval period nominally six 
months from the date of issue of the tender documents. 
BASIS OF DESIGN 
The basis for design of structures was NZ Standard 1900 which 
provided for the protection of structures from earthquake. This 
standard included the effects from fire as a result of earthquake 
damage. Noise level and visual aspects of the structure proposed 
was to be examined and approved by the Electricity Commission. 
AWARD OF CONTRACT 
Due to delays beyond the control of the contractors/tenderers, a 
decision to award a contract to the selected tenderer was not made 
until May 1974 when company "F" were nominated as the successful 
tenderers following protracted discussion since January 1975. 
The contract time allowed for completion of the project was two 
years subject to budget limitations imposed by the N.Z. Treasury. 
DATE OF CONTRACT FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES 
Upon receipt of official notification to proceed with the contract 
to operate and control the project. The official project date 
for the purposes of establishing the critical path for the 
contract was set as June 1975. This required that the 
mobilisation of design staff, sub-contract allocation, 
manufacturing and assembly, including advance orders for 
specialised items would be finalised and in position by no later 
than September 1975. 
MONTHLY PROGRESS 
The progress of the contract is set out showing the reason and 
background to delays where appropriate. 
JUNE 75 - SEPT 75 
Basic design prepared for approval by the client with reference to 
the original tender documents. This period was used to provide 
sufficient design details to satisfy the relevant authorities that 
the design would meet the environmental, planning and standards 
required. Such approval is normal in a major project and forms 
the basis for detail design of foundations, services and 
coordination with other contractors in the field. 
DEC 75 - APRIL 76 
The client indicated a major change to the original coal 
specification for the power station due to seam quality changes in 
the supply situation. 
Extensive modifications to the coal handling plant were required 
which affected foundation details. As most of the foundation 
work was excluded from the coal handling plant contract this would 
delay access to the site. As will be noted, this amounted to a 
delay of some eight months. 
SUMMARY OF DELAYS AT DESIGN STAGE 
DEC 75 - SEPT 76 
DELAY 
MONTHS 
1. Coal quality design change 5 
2. Foundation design change and lack of site access 2 
3. Notification of change to earthquake code -
halt in detail design. 1 
Total 8 
SEPT 1976 
The client notified the contractor of changes to the original 
design Standard NZ1900/Page C164 Structural Design. A revised 
code NZ4203/1976 (draft form only) would require change to the 
design already approved and completed in order to meet the new 
seismic standards. The changes included: 
a) Dynamic analysis to be made on the behaviour of structures 
proposed when under the influence of seismic activity. 
b) Post elastic analysis. 
c) All bolted connections to be designed on the basis that the 
original of 1.2 times the work load would now be based upon 
1.2 times the incoming load i.e. the load generated by 
individual members in order to comply with b). 
Bow's Notation 
Pin Jointed Frame 
(d) Foundation design modified to conform to the code since 1976, 
would be treated as members. 
SEPT 76 - APRIL 77 
This period created further delays to the contract programme as 
the new design required approval of the client prior to proceeding 
with manufacture. In addition the contract called for approval 
of any changes to the contract value. This item must be closely 
examined by managers and supervisors in any project. 
MAY 1977 
Following approval of the structural changes required to meet the 
new NZ 4203/1976, the clients architect requested aesthetic 
changes to the bracing of trestles. This included a design 
change to the cladding originally approved. In the case of the 
cladding the client believed that this would result in a cost 
reduction. Such design requirements requested by the client do 
not necessarily reflect a direct cost reduction and the contractor 
proceeded with the work subject to price difference negotiation. 
Details of design changes are set out below as an indication of 
the engineering/management/financial aspects of a project and do 
not necessarily reflect the true cost of change. 
The estimated price variation of $40,704 must be examined from the 
site management and project management viewpoint. The following 
chain of events occur: 
a) Contractor notified of proposed variation. 
b) Site management examines the nature of change and where this 
fits in with programme - estimated time loss or gain, 
c) Design engineer prepared modified plan. 
(d) Process officer obtains costing if new material required. 
(e) Accountant costs change. 
(f) Notify client of cost effect. 
(g) Site management notifies sub-contractor etc. 
(h) Approval from client. 
DECEMBER 1977 
Due to financial restraint imposed by the N.Z. Treasury the 
contractor was committed to re-programme the work on the basis of 
a 12 month delay in the delivery of coal to the bunkers for the 
testing and commissioning of the system. Although this was 
seemingly a matter of adjustment of programme the seam quality 
which would be delivered was such that the transfer stations would 
require re-design. 
The implications of change must be carefully examined by project 
managers and the prolongation claims arising from such occurrences 
can often be a cause of loss of credibility of a contracting 
company and may result in loss of business. 
Appendix sets out typical examples of the type of negotiation and 




The effects of industrial disputes are not only financial and it 
is very difficult to retain the confidence of a client where a 
major trade union engages in a campaign for increased benefits 
both financial and improved working conditions. 
The contract under review was at a critical stage when the Metal 
Workers Union commenced industrial action against the contractor 
on the basis of a full order book. 
Where an extension of time is sought by the contractor due to 
industrial troubles, the client's first step is to recommend that 
the work be contracted out of the disputed arena in order to avoid 
prolongation. 
Such a procedure if it is possible to achieve, will inevitably be 
to the cost of the contractor since the client is uninvolved. In 
most cases where a large trade union is involved, there will be an 
embargo placed on any firm undertaking to do the work. 
This particular industrial section was not a dispute however, and 
the client accepted that "force majeur" could be applied to permit 
some prolongation of the contract provided that the contractor 
only claimed Consumer Price Authority increases for work completed 
but no claims for overtime or bonus payment would be recognised. 
From December 1977 until the completion of the contract in 1980 
the relationship between client and contractor became increasingly 
strained due to the lack of progress on the project and this is 
highlighted by the examples of correspondence in appendix ???? 
CHANGE OF D E S m - FLOWPATH 
FIGURE A.5 OVERSEAS CLIENT CHANGE OF DESIGN FLOWPATH 
The NZ Electricity Commission remained aloof from the site 
operations from an industrial point of view, but the local unions 
strongly supported their Australian counterparts and generally 
operated on a go slow/overtime ban and intermittent stop work 
meetings similar to the tactics used at the base factory in 
Australia. 
It is considered that any Australian company involved in an 
overseas venture, i.e. outside Australia including NZ, will 
require to research the strength of local trade unions and also to 
include in the future a set of conditions of payment for 
prolongation. 
These conditions indicate clearly that a very firm overall review 
of a project must be maintained concurrent with the work in 
progress. The use of a computer aided work model is believed to 
be essential to protect the interests of client and contractor. 
There can be no room for site compromise without pre-conditions, 
and experience in the mining, civil and mechanical industries in 
Australia today highlight the lack of foresight in management and 
in market research. 
Reference to the trade figures show the marked decline in economic 
performance which is the major problem facing Australia. 
BULK HANDLING MATERIALS CONTRACT 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE - RECORD AT YEAR 4 
Fixed price with Inflation Index allowance 
allowed in sum for 2 year period 
$A to $NZ exchanged rate clause included. 
10% bank credit guarantee against delivery 
conditions. 




YEAR VALUE COSTS 
DISBURSED) FORECAST ACTUAL 
BEFORE TAX TAX NETT 
PROFIT PROVISION PROFIT/LOSS 
1 1,089 - 858 231 116 116 
2 6,115 - 5,055 1,060 530 530 
3 6,228 4,829 6,277 (-49) (699) (-49) 
4 3,306 3,034 3,944 (-638) (272) (-638) 
7,863 16,134 1,291 1,617 646 
16,738 -687 971 
604 604 646 
The losses in years 3 and 4 and Warranty year 5 debited against 
total company profits. Tax provision deducted from profits year 
4,5,6. 
The financial performance prepared at year 4 shows the budget 
position prepared at year 4 for the purpose of forward planning of 
expenditure. 





debited directly to the contract account, 
A LETTER FROM OVERSEAS CLIENT TO COMPANY F 
Company F Performance 
At our meeting on 4 and 5 December 1980 it was agreed that Coal to 
stockout plant would be deemed sufficiently complete for the fine 
tuning to commence as at 5.12.80 and that the takeover certificate 
would be issued 30 project working days after that date subject to 
all outstanding items being completed. It was also agreed that a 
similar course of action be pursued on the Coal to Bunker plant, 
except that the plant had yet to be completed sufficiently for 
fine tuning to commence. 
Since December 1980 outstanding work on the coal handling project 
has been closely monitored and the matter of completing 
outstanding items has been the subject of continual review between 
New Zealand Electricity site staff and F Sydney (Mr. J. Barrett). 
Despite persistent endeavours by New Zealand Electricity to 
expedite progress on the lists of outstanding items, items still 
remain unfinished and takeover procedures cannot be completed 
because certain of the outstanding items are essential to permit 
the plant to be operated in a safe and proper manner. In the 
face of this, and repeatedly over-running target dates, F have 
steadily run down their site establishment and plan to 
dis-establish completely at the end of May. 
It is clear that in spite of the reasonable notice given and time 
allowed by New Zealand Electricity, F have failed to complete the 
outstanding items. Further, it is apparent that the F resources 
and contract management procedures are inadequate to ensure that 
the remaining work can be completed within a short period. 
Having considered the situation, we sent to you, and now confirm 
our telex PSS 1680 of 8.5.81. 
We therefore confirm that we have given notice in our telex of 
8.5.81 that in terms of Clause 12 of the General Conditions of 
Contract, F are regarded as being in breach of contract by reason 
lack of due diligence and expedition in completing the works, and 
failure to comply with instructions to finalise outstanding work 
and correct notified defects in readiness for commercial service 
of the plant. 
The outstanding work to be completed and defects to be rectified 
are as previously advised to your site representative by New 
Zealand Electricity project staff, and as listed on the attached 
schedule. 
We further confirm that notice has been given in our telex of 
8.5.81 that unless all outstanding work is completed within 20 
days from the date thereon, we propose to take the remaining work 
out of your hands and have it completed at your cost and using 
your equipment, as provided for by the terms and conditions of 
Clause 12 of the contract. 
Please note that the outstanding work and defects listed in the 
attached schedule are required to be completed or corrected as an 
integral part of your obligation under the contract and as a 
pre-requisite to the issue of any Taking Over Certificate. 
Allbook Bindery 
91 Ryedale Road 
Phone:8076026 
